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Summary 
Rich countries use foreign labour and migration to address labour shortages and aging 
society problems. Between 2004 and 2014, the number of immigrants in Norway 
doubled. The figure grew from 348 940 to 759 185 immigrants constituting 14.9% of 
the total population. Immigrants from Poland make up the largest immigrant group in 
Norway with a total of 84 000 persons 13.2% of total immigrants in Norway. The 
Polish immigrant community has grown exponentially to over 12 fold in the last ten 
years. If the immigration rate of growth persists the migrant will double again in ten 
years and reach between 24 % and 30 % of the total population. In this way Norway is 
heading towards a major demographic change due to the nature, pattern and scope of 
immigration that has taken place since 2004.  Despite these trends, economic and social 
policies are often based on the assumption of stable population composition and 
sustainable population growth. Policy and decision makers seem unprepared to meet 
these imminent demographic realities in the near future. 
 
This research aims to enhance the understanding of and gain insight into the process of 
migration growth that leads the Polish migrant group to become the largest immigrant 
community in Norway.  Through this improved understanding and insight the study 
will: (a) Provide a better understanding of the underlying structure that influence and 
govern Polish migration dynamics, (b) allow policy makers to understand why 
migration trends rise, what can be expected of migration trends in the future, and how 
can migration be regulated. What happened? Why? How to regulate? The main 
research questions are as follows. Why and how did Polish migrants rapidly rise?  How 
can migration flow be regulated?  
 
Migration literature emphasizes the need for multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary 
approaches to study issues and theories of migration. The lack of a dynamic model that 
captures the internal and integral effects of key variables that influence migration in a 
complex environment, constructed a foundation for applying system dynamics (SD) as 
the methodological approach for this study. The SD philosophy is based on the premise 
that the behavior of any system or entity is primarily caused by its structure. As a result, 
an SD integrative model (explanatory) has been constructed. The model captures the 
dynamics of Polish migration and reflects the inter-connectivity and the underlying 
feedback structure behind Polish migratory patterns of behavior. The model is a 
representation of a group of hypotheses about what happened and why. The model is 
based on and integrated from a representation of how the real system works within the 
   iii                     
frameworks of different relevant migration theories. The overall research objective is to 
produce a better understanding of the dynamics of Polish migration and pose questions 
regarding some of the existing theories and hypotheses. Model validation ultimately 
allows for evaluation and testing of the different theoretical hypotheses about how the 
model structure produces the observed behavior (comparing model simulation outcome 
to historical data). 
 
Based on model validation and testing, the study shows that the model is able to 
replicate the historical behavior of Polish migrants for the right reasons. The model is 
used as a foundation to design policy that explores how Polish migration flows can be 
controlled. Historically, the majority of migration policy has aimed to control and 
regulate entrance (inflow). However, statistics show that these policies achieve little 
success in arresting the growing rate of migration. The policy considered in this study 
aims to regulate migration outflow by initiating an incentive compensation program to 
encourage excess migrants to return home. Feasibility analysis and implementation 
constraints are included in the policy - both of which are envisaged as vital criteria in 
evaluating the recommended policy. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Economic and demographic differences have influenced the shape of labour mobility 
and migration across Europe during the last decade. Rich societies in Europe are 
experiencing rapid population aging and in the last decade many of these countries have 
been confronted with stagnation and a decline of their native labour forces. Labour 
shortages, especially in the low skilled labour market segment, have increased rapidly. 
Statistics shows population ageing will continue to grow. Many countries have 
addressed labour shortage and aging society problems though a strategy of migration 
and foreign labour mobility. As shown in the population pyramid (Figure 1: left), 
Norway is experiencing an aging population with a high percentage of the population 
falling in the 40-95 age categories. These age categories have grown rapidly over the 
last few decades (Figure 1: right). The higher population in the age category 20-66 is 
attributed to 358 421 labour migrants (16% of labour force - Statistics Norway SSB). 
 
 
Figure 1: Norway rapid aging population trend 
Since 2004 ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) have joined the 
European Union (EU). The enlargement of the EU has removed barriers between, 
nations and has opened old EU member state labour markets to CEE labour forces. It 
which allowed labour to move and work freely triggered a wave of mass movement of 
labour across Europe since World War II. Controlling the migration flows in the EU is 
a controversial issue that raises questions about the effectiveness of national policy and 
regulation in controlling migration. Furthermore, it questioned the migration effect on 
the stability and sustainability of the labour market and welfare state. After European 
Union enlargement, the inflow of citizens from the ten new member states increased 
substantially to the Nordic countries. Norway became a primary destination among the 
Nordic countries for CEE labour migrants. By the end of 2014 there were 633 110 
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immigrants (12.4 % of population) and 126 075 Norwegian born to immigrant parents 
in Norway (together they constitute 14.9% of population) (Figure 2: left). Immigrants 
from Poland make up the largest immigrant group in Norway with a total of 84 000 
person 13.2% of the total immigrant population (Figure 2: right-SSB data). 
 
 
Figure 2: The rapid increase of migrant in Norway specially form Poland 
Since the EU enlargement in 2004, the number of immigrants has doubled growing 
from 289 104 immigrants (6% of population) and 59 836 Norwegian born to 
immigrants (together they constitute 7.6 % of population) to 759 185 persons (14.9% of 
population). Moreover, over this ten year period, 80% of the increase in Norway’s 
population is attributable to immigration (Figure 3: left) 
 
 
Figure 3: Norway population growth rate and prediction scenarios 
Despite these trends, economic and social policies are often based on the assumption of 
stable population composition and sustainable population growth. Therefore, policy and 
decision makers are unprepared to meet the demographic realities in the future. Polish 
immigrants have grown exponentially to over 12 fold in ten years and the total number 
of immigrants has doubled in the same period.  In this way, Norway is heading towards 
a major demographic change due to the nature, pattern and scope of immigration that 
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has taken place since 2004. Public and social debates about immigration issues have 
become an everyday topic of conversation in Norway. If the immigration rate of growth 
persists, it will double again in ten years reaching between 24% and 30 % of the total 
population. This figure excludes the effect of the low Norwegian population growth 
rate of 1.2% relative to that of immigrants 2.1% (SSB data). Most of the population 
trends predictions (Figure 3: right) are based on what is called black box models. These 
models are based on the traditional dependent-independent relationships, and uses 
either trend-based extrapolation (Howe and Jackson 2006) or quantitative analysis 
techniques mainly econometrics (Brunborg and Cappelen 2009; Hatton and Williamson 
2003, 2006). Howe and Jackson find that most US and European countries have based 
migration projection on a little theory and undefinable methodology. Recent study in 
Norway (Brunborg and Cappelen 2009) has considered economics and other factors in 
their migration projection model. Basically, these models identify the causal impact of 
the number of variables on migration and tested it against sample data. The test is to 
measure if these variables are capable of explaining migration over time and between 
countries (as measured by R squared). Longhi et al (2004) conducted an extensive 
review on 165 wage impact of migration studies for many OECD countries. They found 
that the majority of the estimated variables vary widely from one study to another and 
sometimes within the same study. Two possible explanations have been identified: 
either the conducted econometrics analyses were inappropriate, or there are other 
variables that need to be included.  
 
The major weaknesses of these kinds of models are that they ignore the 
interdependency and the mutual causality nature of the relationship between these 
variables. In addition, the projection model building process ignores how these 
variables interact in a highly complex and dynamic real world. Moreover, the modeling 
approach ignores the underlying dynamic structure that creates the pattern of behavior 
of these variables. Consequently, regulating the immigration flows (and its effect on the 
stability and sustainability of the labour market and the welfare state) is a major 
challenge for the Norwegian policy maker. Given the rapidly changing migratory trends 
and composition within Norway, it is important for policy makers to:  
 
• Question the demographic (particularly migration) assumption and projections on 
which economic, welfare, and migration policies are based. 
• Consider the existence of underlying feedback structures that produces the 
migratory pattern of behavior and understand that this structure is critical for 
policy options. 
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• Consider the fundamental historical and recent changes in regional population 
and migration trends. 
• Explore new ways to control and regulate the migration flows. 
1.1 History of Polish Migration to Norway 
In the 1980s a few thousand Polish political refugees moved to Norway. In the 1990s, 
after the collapse of communist regime, thousands of short term and seasonal workers 
came to Norway via bilateral agreements and worked temporarily in the agriculture 
sector (Freiberg 2012). In 2004, Poland membership in the EU opened the door for 
large-scale labour migration inflows to Norway. This massive move changed the 
migratory landscape in Norway from humanitarian migration dominance to intensive 
labour migration. Polish migrants are hired to work in specific sectors mainly: 
Construction, Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Low skilled services (Freiberg et al 
2013). Norway has become the most attractive destination for Polish migrants due to: 
• High standards of living: HDI 94 rank (1), Quality of life Index QLI 175 rank (11)1 
• High wage level: 65820 USD constant price (2004, OECD Statistics)2 
• High Life expectances: 80 years and aging population (2004, World Bank Data WBD)  
• High Per-capita GDP: 56627 USD current price and GDP grows by 5% (2004, WBD) 
• Low unemployment rate: 4.5 % and high female employment (SSB data) 
• High demand for labour in Construction, - ordered index grows 50% 2004 and reach 
125% 2007 – (2010 is a base year- SSB data) 
1.2 Characteristics of Polish Potential Migrant 
Since 1990 the Polish economy and labour market has shifted and transformed from 
one characterized by government intervention and public sector dominance towards a 
market driven economy. Prior to this shift the majority of the workforce was employed 
in the protected industrial sector and labour intensive agriculture sector. The 
restructuring of the economy leads to a large number of the workforce being retrenched 
and displaced. These individuals where then was left to struggle in the new liberal 
economy (Freiberg, 2012). The unemployment rate was very high and it reached 19% 
in 20043. Despite the Polish economy’s successful transition to a market economy, the 
per-capita GDP was 6639 USD (current price) and the GDP growth rate was 4% (2004, 
WBD). The Polish wage level was 11,939 USD (constant price) (2004, OECD), which 
                                                 
1 HDI Human Development Index (UNDP annual report). QLI data www.numbeo.com 
2 OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
3 Central Statistical Office of Poland 
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stood at about 20% to 25% of the average level in the EU countries. Due to these 
conditions and the characteristics of the Polish labour force of - high unemployment 
rate, and lower wages - Poland had a huge number of potential labour migrants ready 
for a rapid emigration once opportunities became available. For the following reasons 
Poland will be the migration model prototype:  
 
• Polish migrants are the largest migrant group in Norway. 
• Data about Polish migrants is available from different sources allowing cross 
examination for data reliability. 
• Polish migrants are the largest migrant group within the Scandinavian countries 
and in many European countries - where the size of the Polish migrant 
community is similar to Norway. This allows for estimation and comparison of 
some of the model parameters value. 
1.3 What Is The Problem? 
Large numbers of migration studies (including those conducted in Norway) are 
theoretical and descriptive in nature (Arango 2000; Castles 2008; Massey et al 98; 
Freiberg 2012, 2013). These studies add to the store of knowledge about migration by 
providing updated statistics, trends, and fresh arguments (Russel 2000; de Hass 2014). 
However, models developed based on research and existing theories have not 
progressed beyond a description of causal relationships between key variables. Most 
empirical studies use data and statistical analyses to measure the impact of migration on 
wages and employment in the host countries and the impact of remittances on receiving 
countries (Longhi et al 2004; Borjas 2005; Reed and Latorre 2009). The majority of 
empirical studies are measurements of a vector of independent variable’s effect on a 
dependent variable. The findings and contributions of these studies are merely 
descriptive in nature and they do not provide a solid foundation for policy analysis and 
design.  
 
The existing approach and research design need operationalization and dynamism to 
handle the complexity of migration and to test the existing theories and hypotheses. At 
present the research lacks a dynamic model that captures: (a) the reality of the real 
world - how exactly the Polish migration rise (b) the migration decisions and (c) shows 
the internal and integral effects of key variables on migration. These deficiencies 
indicate the need for a new approach. Building on that, this research is an attempt to 
overcome the impediments of current research methods. Labour migration in general, 
and Polish migration in specific, is a new-old phenomena new for Norway and old - if 
we may generalize - because it follows a similar pattern and behavior of previous 
                                 6 
labour migrations in the world. This type of migration may be considered the first 
migratory stage as it is a male dominated labour migrant economy (Figure 1: left page 
(1) shows a higher percentage of male to female in Norway). Historically, first stage 
labour migration is often followed by a second wave of family formation and family 
unification types of migration. This means that if the government intervenes via new 
regulation to stop the inflows of labour migration it will be faced with other types of 
migrations inflows.  
 
When Polish workers started arriving after 2004, within the framework of the EU’s free 
movement of labour and services, they were able to move, work and acquire social 
rights for varying periods of time. Migration became a controversial and hotly debated 
issue in Norwegian policy. Government, politicians, pressure groups, employers, and 
recruitment agencies thought that cheap flights and internet based communication make 
work in another country no longer had to involve a permanent relocation or any mental 
or social re-orientation towards the receiving country. Rather, these groups envisioned a 
transitional and circular migration pattern similar to guest and seasonal workers 
(Freiberg 2012). Moreover, recruitment practices and the high costs of living and 
accommodation in Norway gave the impression that migrants would be incentivized to 
engage in temporary and circular migration to maximize the migration benefits of the 
economic differences between Norway and Poland. However, the opposite of that is 
what is happening. Controlling the migration flows and migrant choices regarding 
whether to settle or go back home is far beyond the current government policy. The 
secretary general of Nordic Council of Ministers stated:  
 
“Although the new labour migration has been welcomed in the Nordic countries, it has 
also become evident that a huge influx of migrant workers can have unforeseen effects on 
the stability and sustainability of the Nordic labour market models and welfare states. Even 
if the possibilities for controlling the flows of migrants within the common European 
labour market are scarce, there is still a considerable room for national policies and 
regulations (Freiberg et al 2013)”.  
 
These concerns trigger an alarm signal regarding future trends of labour migration and 
the need for an understanding of the underlying structure that governs the migratory 
pattern of behavior, as well as the need to explore ways to regulate it. The flows of 
labour migrants from CEE countries to Norway, in particular Poland, raise challenges 
to the Norwegian social-economic system. These challenges include economic, social, 
and legal factors, which highlight the issues of: 
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• Migration Growth: What is the underlying structure that governs and shapes the 
pattern of migration behavior? 
• Migration Prediction: What factors contribute to the rise in migration flows and 
how do they interact with each other to produce current and future trends? 
•  Migration Policy: How can migration flows can be regulated? 
1.4 Research Question 
The research question is:  Why and how did Polish migrants rapidly rise? How can 
migration flows be regulated? 
 
 
Figure 4: The rise of Polish migrant in Norway: The problem reference mode 
Reference mode is the historical trend of the dynamic problem that this study attempts to explain and 
reproduce this trend (pattern of behavior) for the right reason.  
 
The objective of this research is to enhance the understanding of and gain insight into 
the growth and development process of Polish migration which lead to the Polish 
migrant group becoming the largest immigrant group in Norway. Through this 
improved understanding and insight the study will: (a) provide a better understanding 
of the underlying structure that influences and governs Polish migration dynamics and 
(b) inform policy makers: why migration trends rise, what can be expected of migration 
trends in the future, and how can migration can be regulated. What happened? Why? 
How to regulate? 
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1.5 Why System Dynamics “The Research Methodology”  
The Research Position: Migration research tries to answer questions about the 
initiation, continuation, assimilation and impacts of migration. There is no single, 
unified theory of immigration that simultaneously addresses all of these issues. Instead, 
a number of theories or hypotheses have been developed to explore each of these 
various questions (Borjas 1989). The lack of an integrated migration theory and data, as 
well as the mathematical difficulty of modeling migration processes has hindered the 
study of migration (Brettell et al 2008). Literature on international migration identifies 
various types of migration and emphasizes the need for an interdisciplinary approach to 
study issues and theories of migration. Answering the aforementioned questions 
triggers the need for a research approach that draws upon theories of the causes of 
migration. These theories may come from more than one discipline (involving multi-
disciplinary inquiry) or they may combine perspectives from at least two disciplines 
(inter-disciplinary) (Brettell et al 2008). Three types of migration have dominated the 
study of migration: labour migration, settler migrants, and refugees. The increasing 
diversification of migration types and processes requires a theory that incorporates a 
variety of perspectives, levels and assumptions that provide synthesis of key concepts 
and theories of migration to generate a complete framework of migration system 
(Messay et al 1993; Russel 2000; Arango 2000; Brettell et al 2008). Researchers 
attempting to describe, explain and model the key factors that influence migration have 
often argued that a comprehensive or universal migration theory is unachievable 
because migration is too complex and diverse a phenomenon (de Hass 2014). There is 
no single theory or model that captures the full complexity and dynamics of migration 
owing due to the following: 
 
• The increasing diversity of migration flows, mixed migration flows, and migration 
motivation in the new global political economy. 
• The fact that existing migration theories and models developed to explain 
migration are complementary rather than exclusive. 
• Data problems: availability, measurement of the migrant quantity, defining the 
variables, and variables measurement. 
• Empirical work is either disconnected from theory or the existing theories are 
hardly testing the questions they are supposed to test.  
• Models developed based on the existing theories of migration have not progressed 
beyond a description of the complexity of causal relationships between key 
variables in migration systems. 
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• Existing research methodology needs an operational and dynamic approach that 
handles the migration complexity and tests existing theories and hypotheses. 
 
The following is a specific example from the literature (pertaining to Norway) which 
highlights the strengths or weaknesses of the current research approach in migration. 
Brunborg and Cappelen (2009) have forecasted migration to Norway by building an 
econometrics model that is based on a migration and economic theoretical foundation. 
Most official population forecasts produced by statistical offices are based on an ad-hoc 
simple trend-based extrapolation of migration including Statistics Norway SSB 
(Brunborg and Cappelen 2009). Their model considers migration as a function of the 
unemployment rate and income level in Norway relative to the average in OCED 
countries. The econometrics estimation outcome then used to forecast net immigration 
to Norway based on unemployment and relative income level forecasts. This is a classic 
way of applying an econometrics approach in migration literature. A few remarks about 
this and those econometrics approaches are: 
 
1. Unemployment and relative income level forecasts are based on ad-hoc simple trend-
based extrapolation. This brings us back to square one making the modeling as a second 
order trend-based extrapolation. 
2. Unemployment and relative income level are necessary conditions for migration to 
happen. It does not matter how attractive Norway is as a destination country. Without 
job availability, migration will not happen.  Job availability is a sufficient condition for 
migration to occur. 
3. Migrants have been recruited to fill low-skilled jobs in domestic labour market sectors. 
Therefore, job availability in these sectors is critical in determining migration and needs 
to be considered in the model.  
4. The size of the migrant community and its impact on migration risk and attractiveness 
and tendency to settle are other important variables that need to be included in the 
model. Including these variables will make the model significantly more complex. 
5. The effect of these variables on migration is different and makes the mathematical 
formation of the model equation more sophisticated. Unemployment, income level and 
job availability have independent effects on migration. This means, migration may 
happen due to any reason represented by these variables (e.g. people could migrate 
because of low unemployment rate; relative high income or job opportunities).  While 
community size effect on migration risk and attractiveness have a dependent effect. The 
effect of the community size on migration risk is dependent on its effect on migration 
attractiveness. This means, as risk goes down the attractiveness goes up and vise verse. 
6. Even though the above remarks are considered in building the econometrics model, the 
type of the relationship further weakens and complicates this modeling approach. The 
relationship described in the econometrics model, in general, is the classic dependent-
independent relationship: migration (dependent variable) is a function of relative 
income level (independent variable). What is missing here is that migration will come 
back and influence the factors that brought it up in the first place. Migration will impact 
unemployment, relative income level, job availability, etc. in a mutual causation 
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fashion. The relationship is not dependent-independent, rather it is inter-dependency 
relationship. 
7. Constructing an econometrics model that captures the interdependency relationship and 
considers the inter-connectivity between the variables affecting migration is very 
complex if not an impossible task. 
8. Understanding the relationships and the underlying structure that drives migration is 
critical in order to gain confidence in measuring and forecasting future migration 
trends. This study will introduce a different approach that overcomes this kind of 
complexity. 
Several researchers have studied migration in Norway. Freiberg (2012) explores ways 
in which Polish migrants adapted and assimilated into Norwegian society. He identifies 
factors and the processes that influenced Polish migrant settlement in Norway. A wider 
study (Freiberg et al 2013) that includes all labour migrants from (CEE countries) was 
conducted based on an in-depth migrant survey. The study was conducted among 
Polish labour migrants in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik. These surveys offer rich 
source and available data describing the different patterns, directions and compositions 
of migration flows. The study analyzes and discusses wages, working conditions (social 
dumping) and temporary staffing and recruitment agency issues among labour migrants 
in Nordic labour markets. Furthermore, it explores future policy development and the 
challenges that policy makers face regarding the sustainability of the Nordic labour 
market models and welfare states. Ryndyk (2013) applies social inquiry tools to study 
the social patterns of Polish migrants in Norway and integration challenges. Several 
studies focused on integration and assimilation issues amongst Polish migrants. Cieleń 
(2011) used qualitative research methodology to study the role of labour unions in 
Polish integration. Kmite (2011) focused for Lithuanian workers in Norway using a 
case study and interview method. Narum (2008) studied female Polish migrants also 
using a case study and interview method. 
 
These studies and others contribute to the Polish migration knowledge base by 
providing updated statistics, trends and theoretical arguments and analysis. These 
studies (descriptive in nature) are based on surveys, interviews, case studies and social 
inquiry methods that provide rich qualitative and quantitative data and information. 
Even though the majority of studies related to Polish migrants in Norway focus on 
assimilation issues of migration, they provide detailed information about other aspects 
of migration issues. These studies offer insight into factors that affect migration 
decisions such as moving in, wages, working conditions and settling-in concerns. They 
provide information that highlights factors related to the initiation and continuation of 
migration. The quantitative and qualitative data and analysis conducted in the 
aforementioned studies serve this study by providing the opportunity to: 
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 • Compare and test the reliability of the aggregated data and statistics 
 • Define and quantify (measure) soft variables (e.g. migration risk) 
 • Identify how decisions related to migration are made  
 
Yet, the findings and conclusions of these studies are limited due to the sample size. 
Therefore, it is hard to generalize the findings as well as it misses (or get a sense of) the 
whole picture. Further studies are needed to address other aspects of the migration 
issue. These studies do however form a foundation for effective empirical study. This 
study aimed to build on the existing literature concepts and hypotheses by applying a 
System Dynamics approach that: 
 
 • Builds a bridge between theoretical and empirical analysis 
 • Incorporates quantitative and qualitative data and analysis 
• Stands in-between the aggregated (Macro) level (the whole picture) and the 
detailed (micro) level that is related to how the real system works. 
 • Defines important variables and measurements 
• Formulates a causal relationship between key variables that drive and control 
migration 
• Formulates a model that unifies these different theoretical arguments and 
hypotheses 
 • Explores policy options related to migration issues 
 
Methodological Foundations: The need for an operational and dynamic approach that 
captures the internal and integral effects of the key variables on migration in such a 
complex environment constructs a foundation for applying system dynamics (SD) as 
the methodological approach for this study. The SD discipline uses a simulation 
modeling to study social systems that (a) contain complex relationships involving 
multiple feedback loops that are responsible for endogenously-generated dynamics, (b) 
can be represented in terms of interacting stocks and flows, and (c) contain nonlinear 
structural relationships and time delays that generate behavior for which analytical 
solutions have not been developed or are known not to exist (Wheat 2010). The SD 
approach incorporates empirical research with relevant theoretical research in a 
quantitative and qualitative model.  The SD philosophy is based on the premise that the 
behavior of any system or entity is principally caused by its structure. Model validation 
will ultimately evaluate different theoretical hypotheses about how the model structure 
produces its behavior by comparing model simulation outcome to historical data 
(Forrester, 1994; Sterman 2000; Wheat 2010). 
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Multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary approach: System Dynamics provides a 
comprehensive approach to the study of migration. Constructing a migration SD based 
model will integrate a variety of migration theories that come from different disciplines 
(multi-disciplinary e.g. Economics, Sociology, Demography). In addition, it will 
incorporate a synthesis of theoretical arguments and hypotheses as well as utilize 
diverse empirical methods (inter-disciplinary). Moreover, SD will construct a 
foundation to explain, organize and distill migration literature in a more compact and 
operational model. The multi and inter-disciplinary approach provided by SD addresses 
problems facing migration research such as: 
 
• Clear Identification of variables and concepts. 
• Lack of unified theory to explain and cover the migration phenomena. 
• The inability to test different, theories, hypothesis and policies 
 
This research aims to construct an SD integrative model that captures the dynamics of 
Polish migration. The model will reflect the inter-connectivity and the underlying 
feedback structure behind the patterns and behavior of Polish migration. The model will 
be a representation of a group of hypotheses about what happened and why, based on 
how the real system works within the framework of different relevant migration 
theories. The overall objective of the research is to produce a better understanding of 
the dynamics of Polish migration and question some of the existing theories and 
hypotheses. Further, the model will be a foundation for a policy design face that aims to 
explore how to control Polish migration flows. 
 
Scope of the study “Model boundary”: This study covers the Polish migration to 
Norway from 2004 to 2014. The model explains only the labour migration other types 
of migration are not included but are represented as a constant fraction in the model. 
Short term migration (the number of Polish migrants who work and stay in Norway for 
less than six months and are not registered as residents) is also excluded from the 
model. The Polish migrant death outflows are excluded, due to the number is relatively 
small that it has insignificant impact. Labour shortages and the forces that drive and 
influence it are not modeled. The model aims to replicate the actual data of the Polish 
migrant Stock and Polish migration inflows. Further model boundaries will become 
clear on the detailed discussion of the model in chapter three. Data used, variables, and 
parameter definitions are well documented in the iThink4 version of the model (in the 
map mode). Some variables have been estimated using econometrics method 
(regression), and are documented as such in the appendix. 
                                                 
4 A computer simulation-based model-building produced by isee systems http://www.iseesystems.com 
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Chapter 2: A Bridge between System Dynamics and Migration Theories 
Social, economic, political, and demographic factors are the root causes of international 
migration. The constant and persistent structural changes in the socio-economic, 
political and demographic within societies effectuate changes to the reasons and 
motives for migration. Migration research provides numerous theories based in various 
disciplines that explain why people migrate and the consequences of that migration. 
 
 
Figure 5: A dynamic perspective for understanding international migration 
The explanations of migration in highly complex and dynamic social, political, 
demographic, and economic environments require rethinking the migration theories 
from a dynamic perspective.  A perspective acknowledges and considers migration as a 
result of interactions between political, social, economic and demographic disparities 
between nations. Yet migration affects back all these aspects in a mutual causation 
within that dynamic and complex environment (Figure 5). Migration is dynamic in the 
sense that causes and consequences of migration are linked by a feedback process that 
reflects an existence of underlying structure responsible for shaping migratory patterns 
and behavior.  
 
 
Figure 6: Issues of Migration theories 
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Migration theories address four major issues or questions of migration (Figure 6): 
initiation, continuation, assimilation and its impact in the host and sending countries 
(Borjas 1989; Bodvarsson 2009; Jessica 2008). The focus and boundary of this study is 
to understand the process of migration. The following is a representation of migration 
theories that deal with initiation and continuation of migration from a SD perspective. 
Perspective identifies migration as a dynamic interaction between factors that create, 
and are affected by migration in mutual causation of inter-dependency relationships. 
This perspective reflected by an underlying feedback structure governing the migratory 
pattern and behavior.   
2.1 Push and Pull Theory of Migration  
The push-pull theory argues that migration is closely related to ‘push-pull’ factors 
between origin and destination countries. Economic difficulties such as low wages, 
high unemployment rate, poverty, and political repression push people to migrate from 
their home countries. Better economic opportunities in other countries such as high 
wages, low unemployment and better welfare systems attract migrants to those 
countries. Concepts from push-pull theory form the cornerstone of geographical 
thought on migration (Russel King 2012, White and Woods 1980) and provided the 
hypotheses upon which future migration research and theorization was built (Russel 
King 2012, Boyle et al. 1998). Push-pull theory, draw and formulate four hypotheses 
about the causes of migration. These hypotheses are mapped in the following causal 
link relationships: 
(1) Economic Difficulties  ------(+)-->Push factors    (2) Push factors ----(+)-->Migration 
(3) Economic Opportunities ----(+)--> Pull factors      (4) Pull factors  -----(+)-->Migration 
These four links are interpreted as (1) economic difficulties add to the push factors, (2) 
push factors increase migration, (3) economic opportunities add to pull factors, and (4) 
pull factors increase migration. Combining these causal links together in one feedback 
structure generates a representation of theoretical arguments of mutual causation. The 
following Causal Loop Diagram CLD (Figure 7) demonstrates the SD representation of 
push-pull theory. Push factors encourage migration outflows from the sending country 
due to economic difficulties. 
 
 
Figure 7: System Dynamics representation of Push and Pull theory 
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Migration outflows release pressure on the economic condition in the sending country 
thereby lowering push factors. Diminished push factors reduce the migration outflows 
counteracting Loop C1. Pull factors attract more migration inflows to the host country. 
Rising migration inflows result in fewer available jobs and less attraction for migration. 
Lower pull factors reduce migration inflows counteracting Loop C2. The changes in the 
size of migrant inflows and outflows depend on, and are determined by the interaction 
between these causal feedback loops. In other words the relative strength of these two 
loops will shape the pattern of migration between the two countries.  Push-pull theory 
helps to explain the initiation factors of migration but does not provide insight about 
who migrates and migrant flows size (Brettell et al 2008).The push-pull model 
dominated migration thinking up until the 1960s if not later and reflects on the 
neoclassical economics paradigm (Russel King 2012). 
2.2 Neo-classical Economics Theory of Migration  
The neo-classical economics theory proposes that international economic disparities at 
both macro and micro levels encourage individuals who seek opportunities to invest 
their human capital to do so wherever the highest returns to migration are rewarded 
(Massey et al 1998, Freiberg 2012). This theory assumes that individuals who respond 
to international differences in wages and unemployment are rational utility-maximizing 
agents. Migration decisions are thought to be based on the rational calculation of 
expected benefits relative to the psychological, social and material costs of moving 
(Boreas 1989, Freiberg 2012). The neo-classical model produces several hypotheses 
regarding the causes of migration. These hypotheses are represented in the following 
causal relationships.  
1. Wages Differences  -----------(+)--->  Migration ---------(-)---> Wages Differences 
2. Unemployment Differences ---------(+)->Migration ------(-)->Unemployment Differences 
The main causes of international migration are differences in wages and unemployment 
between sending and receiving countries. In other words, elimination of wage and 
unemployment differentials will end international migration. Migrants will not migrate 
if such differences do not exist.  
3. Labour Supply --------(-)-> Wages ------(-)-> Emigration“outflow” -----(-)-> Labour Supply 
4. Labour Demand ------(+)->Wages ----(+)-> Immigration“inflow” ----(-)-> Labour Demand 
International migration is influenced by labour market mechanisms. This means that 
labour supply and demand determine migration flows size between sending and 
receiving countries as well as the point where migration ceases. Combining these 
causal relationships (Figure 8) with explicit and implicit theoretical hypotheses 
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constitutes a complete causal feedback structure that explains migration between 
sending and receiving countries.  
 
 
Figure 8: System Dynamics representation of Neo-classical theory 
The wage differences between sending and receiving countries encourage labour 
movement. Rising migration in the receiving country increases its labour supply which 
in turn pressures wages lower than it was. Lower wages reduce the wage gap which in 
turn leads to a decrease in migration inflows to the receiving country (Loop C1). Wage 
differences encourage migration out of the sending country thereby reducing the labour 
supply. Lower labour supply pushes wages up, resulting in smaller wage differences.  
The lower wage gap reduces migration from the sending country (Loop C2). The 
unemployment loops follow a similar pattern to the wage loops. The unemployment 
gap between countries stimulates migration flows. Higher migration inflows increase 
the receiving country’s labour supply thus reducing the unemployment gap and 
eventually lowering migration inflows (Loop C3). The same mechanism is applicable 
in the sending country where more migration outflows reduce the labour supply and 
lessen the unemployment gap. Smaller gap reduces migration outflows (Loop C4). The 
extensive critical commentary on the neo-classical approach has mainly been directed 
at its unrealistic assumption of the individual as a rational decision-maker. Moreover, 
the theory ignores the personal, family or socio-cultural factors and political barriers 
related to migration. All these and other factors encouraged scholars to look for other 
theoretical frameworks (Russel King 2012). 
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2.3 Dual Labour Market Theory of Migration  
 
 
Figure 9: Labour market structure in advanced society 
The dual labour market theory rests on three general hypotheses (Figure 9). Firstly, the 
economy contains two sectors: a primary high-wage sector and a secondary low-wage 
sector. Secondly, the primary sector is characterized by high skilled workers, better 
working conditions and higher social status.  The secondary sector is characterized by 
low skilled workers, bad working conditions and lower social status. Lastly, workers in 
the secondary sector display patterns of job instability such as: frequently moving 
between jobs and moving regularly into or out of unemployment and labour force 
participation (Michael 1974). 
 
According to dual labour market theory - as discussed by Piore in Birds of Passage 
(1979) - labour migrant and economic advanced countries is the main cause of 
international migration. The characteristics of advanced industrial societies create a 
demand for both highly skilled and lower skilled workers. Migration is not caused by 
push factors in sending countries but rather by pull factors in receiving countries. The 
theory presents the following three possible explanations of the demand for foreign 
workers in modern industrial-societies: general labour shortages, the need to fill the 
bottom positions in the job hierarchy, and the labour shortages in the secondary 
segment of labour market (Jennissen, 2004). Demographic and social changes in 
modern societies lead to relatively small inflows of natives who are less motivated to 
take jobs at the bottom of job hierarchy. Therefore, labour shortages at the bottom of 
job hierarchy compel employers to recruit foreign workers (Massey et al 1993). Labour 
migration is largely demand based and initiated via employer recruitment in developed 
societies or by governments acting on their behalf. The demand for workers from other 
countries is structurally built-in to the needs of the modern economy and is expressed 
through recruitment practice rather than wage offers (Massey et al 1993, Russel King 
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2012). From a feedback perspective the dual market model may be reflected in the 
following causal links relationships:  
1. Advanced Society ----------- - (+) ---> Living Standard  -------------- (+) --->Low skilled job 
The rising living standard in the advanced society creates a permanent demand for low 
skilled jobs in the secondary labour market. 
2. Low skilled job ---- (-)->Motivation ----- (+) ->Native workforce ---- (-) ->Labour Shortage 
Native workers are less motivated to take jobs in the secondary labour market sectors 
which increase labour shortages in this market segment. 
3. Labour Shortage  ---------- (+) ---> Migration  ----------(-)---> Labour Shortage 
As a result of labour shortages in the secondary labour market, employers are 
compelled to recruit foreign workers. The following CLD (Figure 10) summarizes the 
joint effects of these causal links in a complete causal feedback structure. Higher 
economic growth creates a permanent demand for low killed jobs in the secondary 
labour market. Labour shortages force employers to recruit migrant workers to fill these 
vacant jobs eventually reducing labour shortages (Loop C1). After a period of time 
migrants contribute to economic growth. Higher growth triggers more demand in the 
secondary labour market which promotes the recruitment of more migrants (Loop R1). 
Moreover, higher economic growth further increases the living standard which applies 
upward pressure on labour demand in secondary labour market and stimulates more 
migrant inflows (Loop R2). Finally, the higher standards of living and the over 
representation of migrant workers in the secondary labour market segment drive native 
workers away from job positions in these sectors. Consequently, the demand for 
secondary labour market jobs increases as does the pressure to recruit more migrants 
(Loop R3).  
 
Figure 10: System Dynamics representation of Dual market theory 
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2.4 Network Theory of Migration  
Network theory argues that international migration is a self-sustaining and network 
driven phenomenon. Migrant networks are sets of dense connections and ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination countries 
through linkages of kinship, friendship and shared community origin and identity 
(Massey et al 1993). As a result of large inflows of international migrants, migrant 
networks are formed thereby reducing the costs and risks of movement as well as 
increasing the rewards. Network expansion stimulates additional migration that further 
reinforces and expands the networks and so on (Massey et al 1998). Migrant networks 
provide a durable, valuable and efficient channel for the flow of resources that provide 
newcomers with information and social support for moving and getting started. These 
networks disseminate information about work opportunities to newcomers while also 
feeding information to employers, telling them about the applicants thereby reducing 
the risks and cost associated with hiring (Waldinger and Lithcter, 2003). These 
networks serve employers who can rely on the informal networks of staff members in 
recruitment practice. Staff members can guarantee that newcomers perform 
satisfactorily thereby reducing hiring process time and cost (Freiberg 2012). Migrant 
networks help potential migrants by, for instance, financing travel, arranging 
accommodation, finding jobs and providing information about access to social security 
(Jennissen 2004). Migration networks lower the economic, social and psychological 
costs of subsequent migration.  These networks increase the probability of employment 
and decreases migration risks and the probability of deportation. Networks also make 
migration extremely attractive as a strategy for risk diversification. When migrant 
networks are well developed they put jobs within easy reach of community members 
and provide a reliable and secure source of income. The self‐perpetuating dynamics of 
networks that occur through the progressive reduction of costs may also be explained 
theoretically by the progressive reduction of risks. Every new migrant expands the 
network and reduces the risks of movement for all newcomers eventually making it 
virtually risk-free and costless to migrate (Massey et al 1993). In other words, the 
formation and establishment of this form of social capital enlarges the expected net 
return of migration and increases motivation and ability to migrate. The network theory 
introduces a model that includes several hypotheses about the self‐perpetuating 
dynamics of migration. These hypotheses are demonstrated in the following causal 
relationships: 
1. Migration Inflows ----- (+) --> Migrant Accumulation ---- (+) -->Migrant Community Size 
2. Migrant Community Size -------- (+) --> Social Network  
3. Social Network ---- (-) -> Migration Cost ---- (-) -> Migration Inflows ---- (+) -> Migrant 
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4. Social Network ------ (-) --> Migration Risk ----(-)--> Migration Inflows --- (+)-> Migrant 
5. Social Network ---(+)--> Migration Reward ----(+)-> Migration Inflows ---(+)-> Migrant 
 
Linking these causal relationships together (Figure 11) constitutes a complete causal 
feedback structure that explains the migration Process.  
 
As a result of large migration inflows the migrant community becomes larger and 
migrant social networks are formed. Social networks reduce physical and psychological 
migration risks thus encouraging more potential migrants to migrate (Loop R1). 
Expanding social networks provide more information about the host country’s culture, 
job opportunities and access to social services etc. Which in-turn attracts more potential 
migrants and further increases migration inflows (Loop R2). 
 
 
Figure 11: System Dynamics representation of Network theory 
Additionally, social networks significantly reduce migration costs thereby attracting 
more potential migrants and stimulating migration inflows (Loop R3). Larger social 
networks provide more job opportunities that attract more potential migrants and lead 
to greater migration inflows (Loop R4). Finally, the growing number of migrants 
increases migration rewards (remittances) that provide financial assistance to potential 
migrants and in turn this further increases migration inflows (Loop R5). 
2.5 Institutional Theory of Migration 
According to the institutional theory, as a result of the large inflows of migrants, 
institutions and organizations (profit, non-profit, legal and illegal) will be established. 
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These institutions produce a kind of migration industry (consisting of clusters and 
networks of travel agents, lawyers, bankers, labour recruiters, brokers, interpreters and 
housing agents, as well as human smugglers and traffickers) which aims to promote 
and facilitate the continuation of migration for profit (de Haas 2010). These profit 
based organizations provide services and support such as transport, labour contracts, 
documents, dwellings or legal advice for migrants as well as other assistance. This 
supports and strengthens material linkages between countries. For instance, when travel 
between sending and receiving country increases, cheap and frequent flight connections 
are established. In this way the moving cost of future migrants is lowered (Jennissen 
2004). Non-profit organizations also spring up in order to help migrants settle into the 
host society. Such organizations provide counseling, social services, shelter, legal 
advice, and even insulation from immigration law enforcement authorities. Over time 
individuals, firms, and organizations become well-known to immigrants and become 
institutionally stable. These institutions constitute another form of social capital that 
migrants can rely on and draw upon to gain access to foreign labour markets (Massey 
et al 1993). These organizations become embedded in migrant networks and strengthen 
cultural and social linkages between countries. This social capital formation further 
lowers the risk of migration and helps the migrant to assimilate within the host society 
thereby reinforcing the migration process.  
2.6 Polish Migration Theoretical Framework 
This section will demonstrate how the aforementioned theories of international 
migration - from which various hypotheses were derived and have been identified - can 
be integrated into one theoretical framework that explains how the initiation and 
continuation of migration between Norway and Poland has occurred. Appling both 
combinations of theoretical hypotheses, and what happened in the real world is an 
attempt to explain rising Polish migration to Norway from a system dynamics 
perspective.  
 
Starting with push-pull theory and neo-classic theory: 
Before joining the EU in 2004 Poland had a high unemployment rate (19%), low per-
capita GDP (6,639 USD) and low average wage (11,939 USD). These indicators 
constitute push factors that pressured the Polish unemployed workforce and paved the 
way for a massive migration movement. The situation in Norway was characterized by 
lower unemployment rate (4.5 %), a higher per-capita GDP (56627 USD) and a higher 
average wage (65820 USD). These indicators represent strong pull factors for 
migration. Furthermore, the average wage differences and the unemployment gap 
                                 22 
between Norway and Poland in 2004 were very high. Wages in Norway were 5.5 times 
the average Polish wage and the Polish unemployment rate was 4,2 times the 
Norwegian unemployment rate. Yet, once the door was opened for labour migration the 
flow of Polish migrants to Norway were relatively weak - 1576 migrants in 2004 and 
3271 migrants in 2005. Wage and unemployment differences are a necessary condition 
for migration but not a sufficient condition.  
 
The dual market theory provides an essential piece of the puzzle in explaining the 
Poland-Norway migration situation. The highly developed Norwegian socio-economic 
and political system creates labour shortages in the secondary labour market segment. 
The higher standards of living (High per capita GDP: 56 627, High Living standard 
HDI: 94,4 and High quality of life Index: 175,09) makes the native labour force 
reluctant to take lower skilled, lower status, and lower paying (3D) jobs (difficult, 
dangerous, dirty job). In addition, the higher standards of living create more demand for 
low skilled jobs such as housekeeping, child and elderly care, restaurant, entrainment 
and etc. Additionally, the higher life expectancy (81 years) creates labour shortage in 
elderly care and health sector. Moreover, the higher percentage of women participating 
in the labour force increases and pressures the demand for childcare and housekeeping. 
Furthermore, rapid economic growth, especially in the construction sector in Norway, 
(GDP growth rate: 5.1%, new construction ordered index grew 50% in 2004 and 
reached 125% 2007) lead to an increase in the demand for a low skilled and 
hardworking labour force to meet the rising labour demand. It is worth noting that the 
construction sector is characterized by project management syndrome whereby 
construction projects suffer from cost and schedule overruns. As such, this sector needs 
a continuous flow of flexible and mobile workers. Foreign labourers are highly mobile - 
estimates suggest that immigrants in EU countries are 11 times more likely to move 
than natives (Somerville and Sumption 2009). Unlike natives, foreign workers work 
longer hours including overtime on weekdays and weekends. Together, these factors 
create constant pressure on the demand for a low skilled workforce and constitute the 
first element of the sufficient condition for the rapid growth in Polish migration.  
 
In summary, Norway has sustained a high demand for labour in several industries such 
as construction, manufacturing and services. These jobs require few formal skills and 
are usually found low on the status ladder of domestic labour markets. Moreover, these 
jobs often pay significantly lower wages making them less desirable to the natives. 
Demographic and social changes in Norway create difficulties for employers to recruit 
domestic workers to fill these jobs. As a result small inflows of natives are willing to 
take jobs at the bottom of job hierarchy. Consequently, demand for extensive foreign 
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recruitment increases so as to fill these gaps. After the opening of borders to new EU 
members labour migrants from CEE countries have been recruited to fill the gap in 
these jobs specifically, in construction and low skilled service sectors. Polish labour 
migrants are largely demanded based and initiated by the employer’s recruitment 
practices or by recruitments agencies acting on their behalf (Freiberg et al 2013).  
 
Further developing could be added to the dual market theory in which, process of 
segmentation will occur within the already segmented secondary labour market. This 
process will work in two parallel channels: firstly within the same ethnic migrant group 
(e.g. Polish migrant), and secondly among the ethnic migrant group as a whole. The 
first segmentation occurs as a higher representation of migrant labour in a specific 
sector (Construction) will increase the flow of newcomers to this sector. This will shape 
the patterns of migration flows within that migrant group. Statistics show that Polish 
males are hired mainly to work in the construction sector, while females are hired to 
work in cleaning services (Freiberg et al 2013). Consequently, the second segmentation 
will occurs among the different ethnic groups whereby the concentration of such ethnic 
migrant group in specific sector will shift such group to dominate the sector. Statistics 
show that migrants are recruited to fill shortages in the secondary labour market. 
Within that segmented market some ethnic group’s e.g. Polish migrants are 
concentrated (segmented) in the construction sector, while Swedish migrants dominate 
the health care sector and Pakistani migrants dominate the taxi driver sector. Research 
in the United States and the United Kingdom show that employers often deploy 
common racial, ethnic or national stereotypes when seeking to hire a specific migrant 
group for a specific type of job based on real or imagined characteristics of different 
national groups (Freiberg 2012).  
 
Another level of segmentation will occur within these market segments between 
genders within the same migrant ethnic groups or the migrant group as a whole. In 
conclusion, the market segmentation re-produces segmentation within itself, resulting 
in more segments between ethnic migrant groups, inside the same ethnic group, and 
between genders inside migrant groups. 
 
The network theory provides another important argument to explain the Poland-
Norway migration situation. According to the social network theory, the process of 
migration is a self-sustaining phenomenon. As a result of the large inflows of migrants, 
migrant networks are formed. Newcomers are linked through kinship, friendship, and 
common identity. Migrant networks help potential migrants by reducing the costs and 
risks involved in migration (effect on risk). Networks also help potential migrants 
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increase rewards by financing the journey, finding job and accommodation, and 
supporting access to social security (effect on attractiveness). According to the Polonia 
survey that was conducted in Norway among Polish immigrants, 25% of male and 65% 
of female migrants stated that their main reason for coming to Norway was because a 
friend or family member was already in Norway. More than 80% of subjects reported 
that they knew someone in Norway before arriving themselves (Freiberg et al 2013). 
Polish migrants who come to Norway faced a high degree of risk in the early stage of 
migration (particularly 2004 and 2005). New migrants do not know the language and 
often have a low level of education and poor English language skills. They rely mainly 
on their native Polish migrant community to help them with work necessarily 
communications. In addition, Norway is a very expensive country so accommodation 
and financial support are big issues in the decision to migrate.  Newcomers rely on the 
support of their native community for accommodation and financial assistance during 
the early stages of their arrival. The capacity to accommodate newcomers is directly 
and strongly related to the size of the Polish community. In conclusion, the size of the 
Polish community is a critical factor affecting Polish migration inflows to Norway.  A 
larger Polish community reduces migration risk on one hand, and on the other increases 
migration attractiveness. These two variables are the second sufficient conditions for 
the potential migrant to migrate.   
 
Another major effect of the social networks can be traced to what is called the tendency 
to settle. As the social network grows, a small ethnic community is formed. This 
community is characterized by: strong ties between members such as a common 
purpose, shared difficulties, shared social status and in some cases even working the 
same job. This shared identity initiates the development of shared new values within 
the migrant community and create ties to the new society that they live in. In most 
cases, this will be reflected in an increased tendency to settle. As the social networks 
expand, the average residence time will also increase which in turn lower the migration 
outflow. 
 
Institutional theory provides a further contribution to the argument. As a result of the 
large inflows of migrants, institutions and organizations (profit and non-profit) are 
established. These organizations provide services and support for migrants. Large 
inflows of Polish migrants will results in the establishment of business networks which 
are parallel to and are strengthened by social networks. These business networks create 
linkages between the Polish migrant community and labour market actors. Employers 
and recruitment agencies are tied to and have relied on these networks in recruiting 
practice. Since 2004, temporary staffing and recruitment agencies in Norway have 
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boomed. From 2004 to 2008 the number of employees recruited by these agencies has 
risen from about 17 000 to 40 000 individuals per year (Freiberg et al 2013). These 
networks consist of mediators, subsidiaries, and subcontractors. They provide support, 
information, and sometimes training to migrants thereby reducing the cost and risk of 
migration on one hand, and on the other relieving employers of traditional employer 
responsibilities while decreasing production costs. These agencies have initiated the 
growth and expansion of Polish migration flows. As the stock of migrants rise, the 
social and business networks (migratory networks) expanded. The accumulation of 
migrants and the migratory networks expansion further lowers the risks and costs of 
migration. This has constituted a powerful positive feedback mechanism, giving rise to 
further migration. This higher representation of Polish workers serve the employers and 
recruitment agencies that rely on informal networks of staff members to recommend 
job seekers and guarantee that recruits would perform satisfactorily (Freiberg et al 
2013). The increased representation of Polish workers in the Norwegian labour market 
altered the perception of employers and recruitment agencies about the effectiveness 
and productivity of Polish workers. Moreover, potential Polish migrants would get 
positive impressions about job opportunities and the likelihood of assistance from the 
Polish migrant community when they get in Norway thus increasing migration. 
 
However, it will be always a certain limit or ceiling that prevents the social and 
business networks from reaching maximum and sustaining continued growth. When the 
network reaches a certain size it will start producing negative effects relative to the 
growing size of the community. As migrant numbers increase, the probability of 
finding jobs decreases and unemployment starts to rise. The number of unemployed 
Polish migrants relative to the community size will give a negative impression about 
lower job opportunities to potential migrants. In this way the wheel turns in the 
opposite direction and reduces migration. Furthermore, the attitude towards 
immigrants, the competition between new and old migrants for limited job 
opportunities, and the pressure on wages will create an unpleasant environment which 
may significantly reduce migration attractiveness and increased migration risks.  
2.7 Synthesis 
Based on these different theoretical arguments, a system dynamics perspective evolved 
to combine the aforementioned theoretical hypotheses and arguments in one picture. 
Constructing a unified theoretical framework based on the SD perspective will 
significantly contribute to an understanding of the underlying structure behind the rapid 
growth of Polish migration in Norway. On the other hand it will provide an 
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understanding of the fundamentals of the underlying feedback structure that drive 
migration phenomena in general. The following causal loop diagram consolidates the 
SD views of the different theoretical arguments discussed above. The SD perspective 




Figure 12: The overall feedback structure for Norway and Poland 
 
The unemployment and wage gaps between Norway and Poland push out and pull in 
Polish citizens to migrate to Norway. These gaps increase the relative wage and 
unemployment attractiveness effect on propensity to migrate. Consequently, a higher 
fraction of Polish laborers (represented by fraction migration rate) migrate leading to an 
increase in labour migration inflows. Higher Polish labour migration inflows increase 
the size of Polish community in Norway which in turn leads to the formation of 
migratory networks. Growing business networks increase migration attractiveness 
encouraging more potential Polish migrants to move to Norway. Higher attractiveness 
raises the fraction migration rate thereby increasing labour migration inflows. More 
inflows raise the labour migrant level which further expands the business network 
(reinforcing Loop R1). More migrants expand the Polish social network thereby 
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reducing migration risk and encouraging more potential migrants to move to Norway. 
Lower risk raises the fraction migration rate which leads to higher labour migration 
inflows. Higher inflows raise the labour migrant level which increases the migrant level 
and leads to a bigger social network (Loop R2). The larger social network results in 
longer resident time which reduces labour migration outflows and accordingly keeps 
migrants at a higher level than it would be (Loop R3). The demographic and economic 
changes in Norway create a labour shortage (represented by the job vacancies) in the 
labour market which increases demand for Polish migrants. A fraction of Polish 
migrants will take jobs in primary labour market sectors. Note that a few highly skilled 
Polish workers will find jobs in the primary sector as well. Statistics show that some 
Polish migrants work in different primary jobs - this is consistent with the dual market 
theory. The increased number of Polish migrants who take jobs in the primary sectors 
decrease job vacancies available in the primary labour market (represented by the 
perceived total job). Lower perceived total job will reduce the effect of job 
opportunities on propensity to migrate (represented by total job effect). Lower total job 
effect reduces the fraction migration rate which lowers labour migration inflows thus 
eventually reduces the migrant level as shown in (counteracting Loop C1). The same 
mechanism will occur in the secondary labour market. The majority of Polish labour 
migrants will take jobs in low skilled job sectors. More Polish labour migrant workers 
decrease available low skilled job vacancies (represented by the perceived low skilled 
job). Lower perceived low skilled job will reduce the effect of low skilled job 
opportunities on propensity to migrate. The decrease in the low skilled job effect 
reduces the fraction migration rate which decreases labour migration inflows. Lower 
inflows add less to the labour migrant level (Loop C2). A fraction of Polish labour 
migrants will work in the construction sector (segmentation within this secondary 
labour market segment). The increase in Polish construction workers will decrease 
available construction job vacancies (represented by the perceived construction job). 
Lower perceived construction job will reduce the effect of construction job 
opportunities on propensity to migrate. The decrease in the construction job effect 
reduces the fraction migration rate which decreases labour migration inflows thereby, 
adding less to migrants level (Loop C3).   
 
Based on this SD conceptual framework a conclusion can be drawn that the dynamic 
interactions between these feedback loops in a chain of cause-effect will result in a 
cumulative process that produces the Polish migratory patterns of behavior. Changes in 
the size of the Polish migrant stock depend on and are determined by the interaction 
between these six causal feedback loops. In other words, the relative strength of these 
loops will shape the patterns of migration between Poland and Norway. 
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 A synthesis of the discussed theoretical arguments demonstrates the complementarities 
of different migration theories in explaining migration. The feedback perspective of 
migration makes it clear that the causes and consequences of migration are linked 
through a feedback structure responsible for shaping the migratory behavior. The SD 
approach shows how a number of theories of international migration (from which 
various hypotheses have been identified) can be mapped into one unified theoretical 
framework.  
 
The SD approach moves from a conceptualization face to an empirical face in order to 
test and validate these set of theoretical hypotheses against real world data. 
Constructing an SD based simulation model is the second building block in testing, 
validating and predicting these theoretical arguments. Modeling the above theoretical 
framework will provide an explanation and understanding of the rising Polish migratory 
patterns and pave the way for exploring policy options that may contribute to regulating 
it. In addition, the SD explanatory model will provide a basis for exploring both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the real data against the theoretical framework. 
The next chapter is the operationalization of this synthesized theoretical framework 
where migration dynamics will be modeled as they have occurred in the real world. The 
SD explanatory model articulates how things really work by mapping the physical 
flows of migrants together with the associated information flows that represent their 
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Chapter 3: Why Does Polish Migrant Increase? The Explanatory Model 
The explanatory model is the operationalization of the last chapter’s synthesized 
theoretical framework. The explanatory model aims to articulate the process of 
migration growth that lead to Polish migrants being the largest immigrant group in 
Norway. The model provides a mathematical explanation of Polish migration processes 
and identifies, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the underlying structure that 
influences and governs Polish migration patterns of behavior in Norway. Figure 13 
shows that Polish migrant stock (the total number of Polish migrants in Norway) is the 
accumulation of incoming Polish migrants (migration inflow) minus the outgoing 
Polish migrants (migration outflow). 
 
Figure 13: The Polish migrant stock and flows diagram SFD 
The Polish migrant stock increases via migration inflow (newcomers per year) and 
decreases via migration outflow (Polish migrants leaving per year). These flows are 
respectively determined by labour migration inflow (labour m Inflow) and labour 
migration outflow (labour m outflow) adjusted by the Non labour migrant fraction. The 
non labour migrant fraction represents the number of migrants who accompany labour 
migrants as spouses; a family member or migrant who comes for any other reason 
except working. 
 Non Labour Migrant Fraction = 1 – (Employed Polish Migrants/Polish Migrants)5 
 
 
Figure 14: The Polish labour migrant and potential migrant SFD 
Figure 14 demonstrates that the Polish labour migrant stock is the accumulation of: (a) 
Polish labour migration inflow which depends on the fraction migration rate multiplied 
                                                 
5 (Non labour migrant fraction is Calculated based on the year 2004). 
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by potential migrant stock, minus (b) Polish labour migration outflow which is a 
product of the labour migrant stock divided by average residence time. Potential 
migrant stock is the accumulation of potential labour migration inflow. Potential labour 
migration inflow is determined by foreign labour force demand which depends on job 
needed due to labour shortages in Norway. Foreign labour demand represents the total 
number of migrants required to fill the available jobs in Norwegian labour market.  This 
variable is the sum of the total low skilled foreign labourers needed to fill the available 
jobs in the secondary labour market segment each year, added to foreign labour needed 
to fill the available jobs in primary labour market segment per year. Foreign labour 
demand for the primary sector is calculated according to the percentage of total jobs 
available for migrants (Total Job*Total Migrant / Total Norwegian’s Population). The 
fraction migration rate is determined by a composition of factors that affect the 
potential migrant’s decision to migrate. The fraction migration rate is divided into two 
sets of variables derived from and based on different theoretical hypotheses situated in 
the various migration theories. The first set represents variables drivers associated with 
labour reasons (push-pull theory, neo-classical theory and dual labour market theory) 
(Figure 15: left). The second set represents variables drivers associated with overall 
migration purposes including labour (social network theory and institutional theory) 
(Figure 15: right). 
 
Figure 15: Variables influences fraction migration rate 
The first set of variables (labour concerns) consists of the initial fraction migration rate 
and the effect of five variables on this initial fraction. The initial fraction is calculated 
based on the year 2003. It is the Polish migration inflow divided by Polish migrant 
(Initial Fraction Migration Rate = Migration Inflow / Migrant) 
1.1  The Relative Wage Attractiveness Effect 
The relative wage attractiveness effect on the initial migration fraction represents how 
differences between the average wage in Norway and Poland (wage gap) affect 
decisions to migrate. A wider wage gap between the two countries increases the 
propensity to migrate (relative attractiveness) thereby raising the initial fraction 
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migration rate. Consequently, migration inflow rises adding more Polish migrants. 
Migration, among other factors, causes an improvement in the Polish wage level. The 
improvement in the Polish wage level relative to the Norwegian wage level reduces the 
wage gap which in turn lowers the propensity to migrate. Therefore, the initial fraction 
fall down reduces migration inflow which adds less to migrant stock. As the gap 
narrows the migration inflow slows and stops for wage reasons. The relative wage 
attractiveness effect is modeled as a function of the wage ratio:  
Relative wage attractiveness = f(wage ratio). 
The wage ratio (gap) is a product of Norway’s average wage relative to Poland’s 
average wage in a year base (Wage Ratio = average wage Norway / average wage 
Poland). Note that there will be always a wage gap between the source and host 
countries (minimum gap). In other words there is always a degree of tolerance around 
wage differences represents no change in migration decisions. This means that people 
will not migrate until a significant wage difference exists. This study assumes that the 
wage gap narrows as the wage ratio approaches the value of 2. The following graph 
function6  (Figure 16) represents the relationship between the wage ratio and the wage 
relative attractiveness effect.  
 
  
Figure 16: Wage ratio and relative wage attractiveness effect relationship 
                                                 
6 SD use graph function to model linear or nonlinear relationship between two variables as a base for the 
measurement, if such measurements are not available. The reason is mathematical model often omit 
significant variables because they are unmeasured or immeasurable. Omitting such variables is 
equivalent to say they have ZERO effect. SD stress that mathematical model should be based on the best 
information that is readily available and the design of the model shouldn’t be postponed until all 
parameter have been accurately measured which maybe will never happen (Forrester, 1961). 
 
We set wage ratio as an index from 0 
to 10, where (0) = no differences and 
(10) = average wage in Norway is 10 
times the average wage in Poland. 
We set the Relative wage 
attractiveness effect as index from 0 
to 1. Where (0) = no effect and (1) is 
the maximum effect. 
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The graph shows no effect on the relative attractiveness to migrate until the wage ratio 
becomes higher than 2. At 2 relative attractiveness starts to increase linearly as the ratio 
rises to reach the maximum effect. Three important issues need to be considered in 
formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, (b) one or more specific points and (c) the 
shape. The shape and slope of the graph are based on the estimated relationship derived 
from the actual data. A correlation and regression analyses has been conducted to these 
variables, which results in a form close to the graph in figure 16. The points are chosen 
based on the regression result, available information and judgment. A detailed method 
for the relationship estimations is included in Appendix1.  
 
Relative attractiveness of wage is a necessary condition, for potential Polish migrants 
who are willing to migrate whenever opportunities appear for them, to become a 
migrant. As wage differences increase, willingness to migrate also rises. As the gap 
narrows, the willingness to migrate will decrease. 
1.2  The Relative Unemployment Attractiveness Effect 
The relative unemployment attractiveness effect on the initial migration fraction 
represents how unemployment differences between Poland and Norway 
(unemployment gap) affect a potential migrant’s decision whether to migrate. A bigger 
gap increases the propensity to migrate which raises fraction migration rate. As a result, 
migration inflow increases, which adds more Polish migrants. Higher Polish migrants 
reduce Poland’s unemployment rate which causes the unemployment gap to narrow. 
Consequently, the propensity to migrate decreases slows migration inflow for 
unemployment reasons. Relative unemployment attractiveness effect is modeled as a 
function of Unemployment ratio 
Relative Unemployment attractiveness = f(wage ratio). 
  
The unemployment ratio is a product of Poland’s unemployment rate divided by 
Norway’s unemployment rate in a year base. It is worth noting that there will always be 
an unemployment gap between the source and host countries (minimum gap). There is 
always a degree of tolerance around unemployment differences value a minimum gap 
that represents no change in migration decisions. This level of tolerance is the 
reasonable unemployment level that economists accept as a low unemployment rate. 
This is expressed by the term ‘one digit unemployment rate’. This study assumes that 
the unemployment gap narrows when the unemployment ratio approaches (2). The 
following graph function (Figure 17) illustrates this relationship. 
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Figure 17: Unemployment ratio and relative Unemploy. Attractiveness relationship 
There is no effect on relative attractiveness to migrate when the unemployment ratio 
remains within the acceptable level. As the ratio increases beyond (2), relative 
attractiveness increases, reaching a satisfactory level at 0.8. Thereafter relative 
attractiveness ceases to increase as a result of the fact that at such a high unemployment 
rate, labour migration is not on its own a viable solution for unemployment. Given that 
migration is not a possibility for every unemployed person, the unemployed population 
will engage domestic political channels to solve unemployment. Besides, the shape and 
slope of the graph is based on the estimated relationship of the actual data. A 
correlation and regression analyses has been applied to these variables, resulting in a 
close form similar to the above graph. A detailed description of the method used to 
estimate this relationship is included in Appendix 2. The relative attractiveness of 
unemployment effect is another necessary condition for potential Polish migrants to 
become migrants. As unemployment differences increase willingness to migrate 
increases. As the gap narrows willingness to migrate will decrease. The relative 
attractiveness effect of wage and unemployment are necessary conditions for migration 
to occur based on labour reasons.  
 
The first set of sufficient conditions come from job availability, which modeled as a 
three variables effects: one for primary labour market segment’s (total job effect) and 
two for the secondary labour market segment’s (low skilled job effect and construction 
job effect).  The effects of these variables are a function of job ratios. Job ratio is the 
number of jobs available in each labour market segment relative to the number of 
migrants working in that segment. This reflects perceptions about job opportunity of the 
newcomers which will be passed through formal-informal, social-business networks of: 
native workers, employers and recruitment agencies. The higher ratio indicates more 
job opportunities relative to the number of Polish workers, which increases migration 
We set unemployment ratio as an 
index from 0 to 10, where (0) = no 
differences and (10) = unemployment 
rate in Poland is 10 times the rate in 
Norway. 
We set the relative unemployment 
effect as index from 0 to 1. Where (0) 
= no effect and (1) is the maximum 
effect. 
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opportunities perception. This, leads to a process that takes place via three different 
channels working in the same direction:   
(A) Business sector and temporary staffing agencies will recruit more migrants to fill 
vacant jobs based on Polish representation in these labour market segments. 
(B) Polish workers will propose to their relatives and friends about migration opportunities 
in these market segments.  
(C) Potential Polish migrants will be willing to migrate for the advantage of job 
opportunities in these market segments where native Polish migrants dominate.  
 
The higher ratio creates the perception of increased migration opportunities, causing 
more migration inflow thus adding more migrants. More migrants reduce the ratio, 
indicating that there are less job opportunities, which drives the wheel in the opposite 
directions. As the migrants increases the ratio decreases reducing migration inflow. 
1.3  The Low Skilled Job Effect 
Figure 18 demonstrates that the low skilled job ratio is a product of low skilled job 
vacancies per year (a fraction of job vacancies) divided by labour migrants. This ratio 
represents the number of low skilled jobs available relative to the number of Polish 
labour migrants. 
 
Figure 18: Low skilled job effect on migration fraction for labour reasons SFD 
Information about job vacancies is published on a monthly basis so it takes some time 
for perceptions about the ratio to adjust. The adjustment process will take place over a 
time delay defined as perception time for low skilled job (Perception Time LSJ set to 
the value of one month). Change in perception is formulated as the incremental 
difference between the actual and perceived value divided by adjustment time. It is the 
smoothed7 value of the incremental accumulation of the low skilled job ratio. The 
                                                 
7 Why smooth? Because full and immediate action is seldom taken on a change of incoming 
information, there is a tendency to delay action until the change is insistent (Forrester, 1961). 
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perceived low skilled job ratio represents the smoothed number of low skilled jobs 
available per year relative to the number of Polish labour migrants. The low skilled job 
effect on the initial migration fraction represents how the perceived low skilled jobs 
available relative to the number of Polish labour migrants affects a potential migrant’s 
decision. According to the dual market theory, demand for low skilled workers in the 
advanced society leads to an increase in the recruitment of foreign workers so as to fill 
the bottom positions in the job hierarchy. A greater number of available low skilled 
jobs push up the low skilled job ratio which adds to perceived low skilled job ratio. A 
high perceived ratio increases the low skilled job effect (Polish low skilled worker’s 
propensity to migrate) which pushes up the migration fraction. A higher fraction 
increases the labour migration inflow which adds more labour migrants. More labour 
migrants reduce the low skilled job ratio indicating fewer job opportunities which 
drives the wheel in the opposite direction. A lower ratio reduces the perceived ratio 
which pressures the low skilled job effect down until it reaches (0). At this level 
migration stops due to the lack of available low skilled jobs. The low skilled job effect 
is a function of the perceived low skilled job ratio. The following graph function 




Figure 19: Perceived low skilled job ratio and low skilled job effect relationship 
There is no effect on the propensity to migrate when the perceived ratio equals (0). As 
the perceived low skilled job ratio increases the propensity to migrate will slowly start 
to increase forming an S shaped curve. This is because when the number of jobs 
available relative to the number of labour migrant reaches around 8 (8 new job 
vacancies in front of each Polish worker), it will be high enough ratio that makes the 
propensity to migrate at the a maximum level which points it will no longer increase. 
In other words, the propensity to migrate due to low skilled job ratio will not maintain 
persistent growth. This study sets the maximum effect at 0.65 because Polish migrants 
are mainly recruited to fill jobs in low skilled sectors. Therefore, a higher percentage of 
Low skilled job effect = f( Perceived 
low skilled job ratio).We set low 
skilled job ratio as an index from 0 to 
10, where (0)  = no job  and (10) = 
10 job vacancies per labour migrant. 
We set the low skilled job effect as 
index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = no 
effect and (1) is the maximum effect. 
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low skilled workers will migrate as a result of the higher ratio. On the other hand the 
shape and slope of the graph is based on the estimated relationship derived from the 
actual data. A correlation and regression analyses was performed to these variables, 
resulted in close form similar to the above graph. Details of the estimation method are 
included in Appendix 3.  
1.4  The Construction Job Effect 
 
Figure 20: Construction job effect on migration fraction for labour reasons SFD 
Figure 20 shows the construction job effect modeled in a similar fashion to the low 
skilled job effect. The construction job effect represents segmentation within the 
secondary labour market. Construction labour migrant is the total number of Polish 
construction labour migrants in Norway.  This stock represents the accumulation of the 
construction labour migrant coming-in (inflow) minus construction labour migrant 
going-out (outflow). Construction labour migration inflow is a product of labour 
migration inflow multiplied by sectorial fraction (Sectorial Fraction = Employed Polish in 
Construction / Employed Polish based on year 2008). The construction labour migration 
outflow is determined by labour migration outflow multiplied by sectorial fraction and 
adjusted by the number of registered unemployed Polish construction workers. The 
construction job effect is a function of the perceived construction job ratio. The 
perceived construction job ratio is the smoothed value of the construction job ratio 
(Construction Job Vacancies/ Construction Labour Migrant) adjusted by perception 
time (Perception Time CJ). According to the dual market theory, more job vacancies in 
the construction sector leads to an increase in the perceived construction job ratio. A 
higher perceived ratio raises the Polish construction worker’s propensity to migrate 
(construction job effect).  Consequently, the fraction migration rate increases, which in 
turn increases construction labour migrant inflow adding more construction labour. 
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More Polish construction workers reduce the construction job ratio. Lower ratio 
decreases the perceived construction job ratio indicating less job opportunities and 
driving the wheel in the opposite direction. As the perceived construction job ratio 
declines, the propensity to migrate decreases until it reaches (0) at which point 
migration stops due to the lack of available jobs in construction sector. Note that 
migration to work in the construction sector may stop but migration to work in other 
sectors or for other reasons will continue. The construction job effect is a function of 
the perceived construction job ratio. The following graph function (Figure 21) 




Figure 21: Perceived construction job ratio and construction job effect relationship 
There is no effect on propensity to migrate when the perceived ratio equals (0). As the 
perceived construction job ratio begins to raise, propensity to migrate (construction job 
effect) will slowly start to increase forming an S shaped curve. This is because when 
the number of jobs available relative to the number of construction labour migrants 
reaches around (8), the ratio will be high enough to induce propensity to migrate reach 
a maximum point at which point it will no longer increase. Propensity to migrate due to 
construction job ratio will not grow forever. This study sets the maximum effect to 0.8 
because Polish construction migrants are the dominant group within Polish labour 
migrants, whom according to statistics are the dominant migrant group in construction 
sector. Polish migrants have been recruited mainly to fill job positions in the 
construction sector. Therefore, there are a higher percentage of construction labourers 
that migrate due to higher perceptions of the construction job ratio. Furthermore, the 
shape and slope of the graph is based on the relationship estimated from real world 
data. A correlation and regression analyses has been executed to these variables, 
resulted in a close form similar to the above graph. Details regarding the estimation 
method are attached as Appendix 4. 
Construction job effect = f(Perceived 
construction job ratio). We set 
construction job ratio as an index from 0 
to 10, where (0) = no job and (10) = 10 
construction job vacancies per Polish 
construction worker. We set the 
construction job effect as index from 0 to 
1. Where (0) = no effect and (1) is the 
maximum effect. 
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1.5  The Total Job Effect 
 
Figure 22: Total job effect on migration fraction for labour reasons SFD 
Figure 22 demonstrates that the total job effect modeled similarly to the low skilled job 
effect. Total job effect is a function of the perceived total job ratio which is the 
smoothed value of the total job ratio adjusted by perception time. Total job ratio is a 
product of job vacancies available for migrants (Job vacancies*total migrant/total 
population) divided by Polish migrants. According to the dual market theory, the 
characteristics of advanced industrial societies create demand for both highly skilled 
and lower skilled workers. Building on that, more job vacancies in the primary labour 
market sectors increases the perceived total job ratio. High perceived ratio raises the 
total job effect (propensity to migrate of Polish worker). A stronger total job effect 
leads to a higher migration fraction which increase labour migration inflow and 
ultimately add more Polish migrants.  
 
  
Figure 23: The relationship between perceived total job ratio and total job effect 
More Polish migrants relative to available jobs leads to a reduced ratio indicating fewer 
job opportunities and driving the wheel in the opposite direction. A lower total job ratio 
Total job effect = f( Perceived total 
job ratio). We set total job ratio as an 
index from 0 to 10, where (0) = no 
job and 10 = (10) job vacancies per 
migrant. We set the total job effect as 
index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = no 
effect and (1) is the maximum effect. 
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reduces perception which pushes down the propensity to migrate until it reaches (0). 
This Indicates that migration has stopped due to a lack of available jobs in the primary 
labour market. Total job effect is a function of the perceived total job ratio. The above 
graph function (Figure 23) represents the relationship between these two variables.  
There will be no effect on the propensity to migrate when the ratio equals (0). As the 
perceived job ratio increases, propensity to migrate (total job effect) will slowly start to 
increase forming an S shaped curve. This is because when the number of jobs available 
relative to the number of migrants reach (4), the ratio will be high enough to induce 
propensity to migrate to reach a maximum point at which point it will no longer 
increase.  The propensity to migrate will reach a maximum at around (0.4).  This 
maximum is estimated with reference to the maximum estimation of construction and 
low skilled job effects. Polish migrants are mainly recruited to fill jobs in the secondary 
labour market. Therefore, a lower percentage of Polish labour migrants will migrate 
when the total job ratio increases.  Furthermore, the shape and slope of the graph is 
estimated with reference to real world data. Correlation and regression analyses have 
been conducted to these variables, which resulted in a close form similar to the above 
graph. Details regarding the estimation method are included as Appendix 5. The 
following CLD shows the combined effects of the first set of variables on the fraction 
migration rate for labour considerations.  
 
 
Figure 24: Combined effect of the first set of variables on fraction migration rate 
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The effects of these five variables on the initial fraction migration rate are modeled and 
formulated as a combined additive formulation. The reason is, each variable effect 
should be considered as an independent effect on the initial fraction. In other words, the 
migration decision could be taken based on any one reason (effect) represented by these 
five variables. That is, a decision to migrate may be taken due to unemployment reason; 
wage considerations or job opportunities in any labour market segment.  
 
The second set of variables that affects the fraction migration rate is the networks 
effects (Figure 25). As the Polish migrant community grows, social and business 
networks are formed. Migrant networks help potential migrants by reducing the costs 
and risks involved in migration (effect on risk). Additionally, the networks assist 
potential migrants achieve increased migration rewards by financing their journeys, 
helping with job and accommodation or providing information about access to social 
security etc. (effect on attractiveness). 
 
 
Figure 25: Social and business networks effect on fraction migration rate SFD 
 
 3.6 The Social Network Effect on Migration Risk 
The social network effect on migration risk is the first variable in the second set of 
variables that affects the fraction migration rate. Polish migrants who came to Norway 
in the early stage of migration - particularly during 2004 and 2005 when Poland joined 
the EU - faced a high degree of risk. They face language barriers as they often have a 
low level of education and poor English language skills. They therefore rely mainly on 
fellow Polish migrants to help them with work-related communications. Additionally, 
Norway is an expensive country, so accommodation and financial support are of great 
                                 41 
concern in migration decisions.  Newcomers rely on the support of their native 
community in terms of accommodation and financial assistance during the early stages 
of their arrival. The capacity to accommodate newcomers is directly and strongly 
related to the size of the Polish migrant community. Accordingly, the size of the Polish 
migrant community is a critical factor for posting Polish migration inflow. In the model 
Polish migrant ratio represents the size of the social network (Social Network size = 
Polish migrant ratio). It is an indicator of the strength and size of the Polish migrant 
community and its relative influence both within the migrant community and 
Norwegian society at large. Migration risk is a function of the Polish migrant ratio Risk 
= f (Polish migrant ratio). Polish migrant ratio is the percentage of Polish migrants 
relative to the total number of migrants (Polish migrant ratio = Polish Migrant / Total 
Migrant). To measure the social network impact on migration risk this study assumes 
that risk can be expressed as an index varying from (0) to (1), where, (1) represents the 
highest degree of risk and (0) the lowest (Figure 26). No matter how big the social 
network is there will always be a certain degree of risk involved with migration 
decision due to uncertainties around finances, accommodation, psychological and other 
risk factors. At the other end of the scale there will always be pioneers willing to take 
the migration risk no matter how high it is. There will always be a number of migrants 
who migrate regardless of the risk involved in migration (e.g. refugees).  For these 
reasons 0.3 is set as the minimum degree of risk and 0.8 as a maximum.  
 
  
Figure 26: Polish migrant ratio and social network effects relationship 
This study assumes that risk will decrease in an exponential decay as the Polish migrant 
ratio increases. As the migrant community expands, migration risk will drop rapidly in 
the beginning then, risk decreasing rate will slow down to reach the minimum value at 
(0.3). The above graph (Figure 26) function represents the relationship between these 
two variables. Details regarding estimation methods are described in Appendix 6. 
Migration risk = f( Polish migrant 
ratio). We set Polish migrant ratio as 
an index from 0 to 0.15, where near (0) 
= no significant representation of 
Polish and (0.15) = 15 % of total 
migrant. We set the Social network 
effect as index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = 
no effect and (1) is the maximum effect. 
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 3.7 The Business Network Effect on Migration Attractiveness 
The business network effect on migration attractiveness is the second variable in the 
second set that affects the fraction migration rate. It is modeled in the same way as the 
social network effect. The Polish employed ratio is a reflection and measurement of the 
business network size (Business Network Size = Polish Employed Ratio). Migration 
attractiveness is a function of the Polish employed ratio Attractiveness = f( Polish 
employed ratio). The Polish employed ratio is a product of employed Polish migrants 
relative to the total number of employed migrants (Polish Employed Ratio = Employed 
Polish Migrant / Total Employed Migrant). As the number of Polish employed 
migrants increases relative to the total number of employed migrants, the Polish 
employed ratio will rise. Higher ratio raises employer and recruitment agency 
perceptions about the effectiveness and productivity of the Polish worker. Furthermore, 
potential Polish migrants will perceive a greater number of job opportunities in Norway 
and expect greater support and assistance from their native Polish migrant community. 
Consequently, the fraction migration rate raises leading to an increased flow of 
migrants which adds more migrants.  
 
  
Figure 27: Polish employed ratio and business network effects relationship 
Figure 27 demonstrates that attractiveness can be expressed as an index varying from 
(0) to 1 where (1) represents the highest degree of effect and (0) represents the lowest. 
Attractiveness is limited from exceeding a certain maximum value irrespective of the 
size of migrant community because of such factors as job availability, attitudes toward 
immigrants, and other factors. This study sets 0.67 as the maximum value that 
attractiveness could reach no matter how big the business network is. This study also 
assumes that attractiveness will increase as a goal seeking function. The shape and 
slope of the graph represents the relationship between these two variables is estimated 
Migration attractiveness = f( Polish 
employed ratio). We set Polish employed 
ratio as an index from 0 to 0.20, where 
near (0) = no significant representation of 
employed polish and (0.20) = 20 % of the 
total employed migrant. We set the 
Business network effect as index from 0 to 
1. Where (0) = no effect and (1) is the 
maximum effect. 
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of actual data. A correlation and regression analyses has been performed to these 
variables, resulted in a close form similar to the above graph. Estimation methods are 
detailed in Appendix 7. 
 
A larger Polish community reduces migration risk and on the same time increases 
migration attractiveness. The network effect on migration risk and attractiveness are the 
second set of sufficient conditions that influence potential migrants to migrate. Despite 
the higher migration fraction for economic and labour reasons, migration risk and 
attractiveness due to the social and business network effects controlled the number of 
potential migrants from flooding into the country in 2004 and 2005.  Statistics show 
that in despite of the higher tendency to migrate from Poland (huge differences in wage 
and unemployment, higher job opportunities), migration inflows were small in the 
beginning. Furthermore, the higher inflows in the following years are statistically 
associated with the expanding size of the migrant community. As the size of the 
community expanded, the wheel works at full power causes the exponential growth in 
Polish migration. 
 
The effect of these two variables on the fraction migration for labour reasons is 
formulated as a combined multiplicative formulation. These variables were formulated 
as multiplied formula rather than formulated additively because they are correlated and 
dependent on one another. Therefore, as the risk decreases, the attractiveness increases 
due to the growing community size. In other words, attractiveness would not increase if 
the risk was high and at the same time, risk will not decrease if attractiveness is low.     
3.8 The Social Network Effect on Residence Time 
Last but not least, the labour migrant stock decreases via labour migration outflow 
which depends on, labour migrant stock divided by average residence time and the 
effect of social network on residence time. Another major effect of the social network 
can be traced to what may be termed as the tendency to settle. The average residence 
time (calculated from data = 5.89 years), in which a migrant stays in the country, 
before moving out rises as the number of migrants increases and the migrant 
community expands. Migrant exit usually occurs only when associated with 
unemployment. The decision to leave the country will depend, among other things, on 
expectations around finding a job. These expectations increase as the migrant 
community expands. On average, the migrant’s perception around job availability will 
take time to change before a decision to leave the country is reached. Furthermore, a 
longer length of stay gives migrants a better chance to find job and/or obtain certain 
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social services, e.g. unemployment benefits. These outcomes are the direct impact of a 
large migrant community who are willing to support newcomers in accessing social 
services and finding work. A larger Polish community (strong social network effect) 
increases the tendency to settle which lowers migration outflow. Decreased migration 
outflows will keep the migrant level higher than it would be. To measure the social 
network effect on residence time (Figure 28), we calculated a factor that is multiplied 
by average residence time as indicator for tendency to settle. For example, when the 
factor equals (2), the average residence time will double. This study sets the social 
network effect as an index from (0) to (6) where (0) = no effect and (6) is the maximum 
effect. A factor of (6) means that the average residence time increases (6) times. Note 
that tendency to settle is limited from infinite growth (e.g. the life expectancy is the 
maximum value). In the model (6) is the maximum value (which will be around 36 
years) as a direct effect of growing Polish community.  
 
 
Figure 28: Polish migrant ratio and social network effects on residence time 
The shape and slope of the graph is based on the estimated relationship of the actual 
data. A correlation and regression analyses were used to estimate the relationship 
between the two variables and resulted in a close form similar to the above graph. 
Detailed method for the estimations of the relationship is in appendix 8. 
3.9 Analysis: Why did the Polish migrant stock increase so rapidly? 
The following CLD shows the feedback structure underlying the rise in Polish 
migration to Norway. This pattern of migration behavior is the outcome of interactions 
between six major feedback loops that represent the combined effects of all the 
variables discussed in this chapter. Firstly, the wage and unemployment gaps constitute 
the necessary conditions for Polish migration. Note that, the loops for these two 
variables remain open due to the limitations of this study on one hand, and the 
insignificant effect of the number of Polish migrants in Norway relative to the total 
number of Polish migrants in the rest of the world in the other. There are three 
Residence time = f( Polish Migrant ratio). 
We set Polish migrant ratio  as an index from 
0 to 0.15 where near (0)= no significant 
Polish representation  and (0.15) = 15 % of 
total migrant. We set the Social network  
effect as index from 0 to 6. Where (1)= no 
effect and (6 is the maximum effect. 
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reinforcing feedback loops that accelerate and give rise to migration patterns of 
behavior in Norway. 
 
 
Figure 29: The overall simulation model underlying feedback Structure 
Loop R1 represents business network effects on migration attractiveness. Greater 
labour migrant community generates a strong and wider formal-informal business 
networks which adds to migration attractiveness. Higher attractiveness raises the 
fraction migration rate leading to further increases in labour migrant inflows adding 
more migrants. More labour migrants result in a bigger business network and so on. 
Loop R2 represents the effect of social network on migration risk. An enlarged Polish 
community creates strong social networks that reduce migration risk. Lowered risk 
increases the fraction migration rate which raises labour migration inflow. More 
inflows add to migrant level, which further the expansion of the social network and so 
on. Loop R3 represents the social network effect on residence time. A bigger social 
network encourages migrants to stay longer in the country leading to longer residency 
time. Longer residence time reduces the labour migration outflow which keeps the 
labour migrant numbers at a higher level than they would be. The combined effects of 
these three reinforcing feedback structures give a strong structural reason for the rapid 
rise in Polish migration. Loop C1 represents the total job effect (primary labour market 
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segment) on the fraction migration rate. A higher number of job vacancies in the 
primary labour market increase the perceived total job ratio which pushes the total job 
effect upward. Higher total job effect increases the fraction migration rate which raises 
labour migration inflow. More inflow adds to migrant level which reduces the 
perceived total job ratio. Lower perceived ratio reduces the total job effect which 
decreases the migration fraction and so on. Loop C2 represents the low skilled job 
effect (the secondary labour market segment) on the fraction migration rate. Greater 
number of low skilled job vacancies increases the perceived low skilled job ratio which 
raises the low skilled job effect. This in turn pushes the fraction migration rate up, 
which increases labour migration inflow adding more labour migrants. More labour 
migrants reduce the perceived low skilled job ratio which pushes down the low skilled 
job effect. The weaker low skilled job effect reduces the migration fraction and so on. 
Loop C3 represents segmentation within the secondary labour market segment. A 
greater number of construction job vacancies increase the perceived construction job 
ratio which raises the construction job effect. Stronger construction job effect drives the 
migration fraction up thereby increasing labour migration inflows which add more 
construction labour migrants. A greater number of construction migrants reduce the 
perceived ratio which results in a weaker construction job effect and so on.  The result 
of these loops interaction is the migration behavior depicted in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30: Polish migrant in Norway simulated vs. actual data 
Loops C1, C2, and C3 are relatively weak in the early phases of the migration process 
and it gain strength as the migrant stock increases. Empowering the counteracting loops 
result in what is termed a shift in loop dominance. The three reinforcing loops dominate 
the migration process in the early phases, adding more and more to the migrant level. 
The relative strength of these reinforcing loops dominates and overrules the effect of 
the counteracting loops. Moreover, labour shortages and the high demand for Polish 
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low skilled labour, especially in the construction sector, further weakens the 
counteracting feedback loops and delays the shift in loop dominance. The result of this 
dynamic interaction between reinforcing and counteracting feedback loops produces the 
patterns of Polish migratory patterns of behavior. Simulating that feedback structure 
results in a replication of the actual data as demonstrated in Figure 30. The above graph 
is the first validation test that the model replicates the historical Polish migration 
patterns of behavior for the right reasons.   
3.10  Model Validation 
 
Figure 31: The whole model stock and flow diagram 
The purpose of this study is to explain what happened and why Polish migration to 
Norway increased to the extent that Polish migrants are now the largest migrant group 
in Norway. The major task has been constructing a model that replicates historical 
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Polish migration patterns of behavior for the right reasons. Subsequently, the model 
enables the simulation of various future scenarios of the continuing conditions and 
policy options.  To gain confidence in the model as hypotheses that explain what 
happened and why, in addition to comparing the model's behavior with historical data 
(Figure 30), SD model validation includes a battery of tests aimed at evaluating 
hypotheses about how the model's structure produces its behavior (Wheat, 2010). This 
study conducts model validity tests based on formal procedures outlined by Barlas 
(1996, 2006) and Sterman (2010).  Details regarding the validity tests are documented 
in Appendix 9. Furthermore, the SD simulation based model provides an interactive 
laboratory where the user and reader can perform these tests by him/herself. The user or 
reader can repeat most of the conducted tests in the model interface. The following is a 
brief representation of the validation results.  
 
Direct Structure Validity Tests:  
The model was constructed by mapping how the real system works. The mathematical 
representation of each relationship has been formulated according to information and 
data collected from the real world system. Theoretical frameworks outlined in the 
literature were extensively used and reflected in the model’s structure, involving each 
relationship. Model construction has been an iterative process whereby model structure 
and relationships have been modified and/or changed during testing. Most of the initial 
stocks and parameters value were based on real world data. Except for the social 
network effect on migration risk, the estimated parameters specially, the graph function 
were all estimated using real world data. The social network effect was derived using 
available information and judgment. All of the parameters used in the model have a 
meaning in real life and pass the dimensional consistency test. The unit consistency test 
is a built in function of iThink modeling software that automatically checks unit 
consistency automatically. The model passes these tests.  
 
Structure-Oriented Behavior (Indirect Validity Tests):  
These tests have been conducted assuming that all other variables except those under 
consideration are held constant (ceteris paribus). The test is measuring and evaluating 
the effect of changing the tested parameter value on migrant stock and migration 
inflow. 
First: Extreme condition tests have been conducted with the model in steady state 
condition as well as normal system state. The tests results confirm that model generated 
behavior are consistent with the anticipated real system behavior under the same 
extreme conditions. Furthermore, the results show that the unemployment and wage 
differences cannot generate the observed migratory behavior no matter how much you 
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increase these values (under steady state mode). This indicates that wage and 
unemployment differences are a necessary condition for migration.  
Second: Behavior sensitivity tests have been carried out only in the normal system 
state. The model shows sensitivity to changes over 20% of the value of the tested 
parameters. However, the real system would exhibit a similar sensitivity to the 
corresponding parameters.  Furthermore, the sensitivity tests outcome have showed 
changes in magnitude but the patterns of behavior remain the same. The graph function 
sensitivity tests were conducted by changing the shape and the slope of the graph. All 
test results show a different degree of sensitivity ranked either very sensitive, little 
sensitivity or no sensitivity. All these results show changes in magnitude but patterns of 
behavior remain the same.   
Third: The integration method test showed no significant changes in the model’s 
behavior due to changes in time step or integration method.  
Fourth: The boundary adequacy test indicated that the model’s pattern of behavior is 
not affected by parameter values or external conditions (numerical change but pattern 
of behavior remains the same), but instead by the underlying feedback structure and the 
dynamic interactions between its loops. The model structure creates the observed 
behavior endogenously. 
 
Behavior Validity Tests:  
First: The model generates and replicates the historical behavior of the real Polish 
migrant stock in Norway with a high degree of accuracy both qualitatively and 
quantitatively (Figure 30 page: 46). Furthermore, the model closely replicates the 
historical behavior of other important variables. The shape is closely similar but the 
magnitude and some face shift have happened to some of the variables (Figure 32). 
 
 
Figure 32: Polish migration inflow and Polish labour stock simulated vs. actual data 
                                 50 
Second: Validation aims to evaluate hypotheses about how the model's structure 
produces its behavior. Cutting loops or variable effects that represent a particular 
hypothesis provide the means to test that hypothesis. Assuming that all other variables 
and loops except those under consideration are held constant (ceteris paribus), the null 
hypothesis can be stated as follows:  
Cutting loop or variable under consideration has no effect on migrant stock and 
migration inflow.  
 
The result shows that in all 8 cases the null hypothesis is rejected. This indicates that 
the model, as a group of hypotheses, may be responsible for the observed patterns of 
behavior.  Furthermore, cutting the loops or variables provides a fundamental insight 
into why the counteracting mechanisms represented by loops C1, C2 and C3 (Figure 29 
page: 45) fails to prevent the exponential growth of Polish migrants. A close analysis of 
each loop together with the unemployment and wages relative attractiveness effect 
reveals the following. Despite the improvement in wage level and unemployment rate 
in Poland, the unemployment and wage ratios did not change. This reduces and delays 
the counteracting effects that both variables would otherwise have on migration growth. 
In addition, the structurally labour shortage in Norway constitutes a constant pressure 
on the demand for foreign labour thereby defusing the counteracting mechanism of 
loops C1, C2, and C3. In spite of the effect of these counteracting mechanisms slows 
down migration inflow (Figure 32 page: 49), the counteracting loops remained weak 
and could not stop the rapid growth of the Polish migrant stock.    
3.11 Limitations of The Model 
Firstly, the model does not include the negative effects of social and business networks. 
When the networks reach a certain size they may introduce counteracting negative 
effects on migration attractiveness leading to a reduced propensity to migrate and also 
increased tendency to leave resulting in reduced average residence time.  
 
Secondly, due to the dominance of labour migration in this migratory stage, the model 
excludes the dynamics of other types of migration. Historically, following the labour 
migration stage, a second wave of migration entailing family formation and 
reunification is initiated. This will keep the migration patterns at the same high level 
even after the completion of the first phase (Figure 1 page: 1 shows that the number of 
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male is more than female in Norway). These two limitations reduce the prediction 
accuracy of the model and initiate the need for further research to include these 
variables. However, this study assumes that the counteracting side effects of the social 
and business networks in reducing the migrant stock will be partially compensated for 
by an increase in the second wave of migration. 
 
Thirdly, the feedback substructure for the migration effect on unemployment and wages 
in Poland is not included in the model. Lastly, the Norwegian labour shortage feedback 
substructure is also excluded from the model. These two substructures form part of the 
wider boundaries that related to the impact of migration on Poland and Norway. 
Including these substructures will provide a wider perspective in the study of migration 
and this should be considered in future research. The scope of this study does not allow 
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Chapter 4: How to Regulate Polish Migration? The Policy Model 
The explanatory model identifies two possible scenarios (Figure 33) that predict Polish 
migration trends up until 2030. The first scenario is based on the condition that job 
vacancies remain constant at 2014 levels.  In this scenario the Polish migrant level 
reaches 186 622 in 2030 compared to 84 000 in 2014 (increases over 2.4 fold in 16 
years). The second scenario is based on the condition that job vacancies follow the 
trend evidenced in previous years. In this scenario the Polish migrant level reaches a 
maximum of 127 046 at year 2022 (almost doubled) and then drops to 106 851 in 2030. 
In Norway discussion around the growing number of migrants focuses predominantly 
on assimilation and to some extent on the impact of migration on the welfare state. 
 
 
Figure 33: Migration predictions scenarios, Explanatory model simulation result 
4.1 The Current Policy 
Since 1970’s, a large number of changes to laws and regulations have taken place in an 
attempt to restrict and regulate immigration to Norway. The following is a brief outline 
of major regulations adopted since 2004 (Ådne, Jørgen and Terje, 2011): 
• In 2004 New CEE countries joined the EU and gained easier access to Norway. Some 
transition rules were put in place in order to limit migration.  
 • A more restrictive policy was introduced in 2006; foreigners who had arrived on tourist 
visas and then applied for family reunion were less likely to be granted residence.  
 • 2008 saw a tightening of the rules related to family reunion; authorities made it more 
difficult for family members to enter if the ability to provide for the family was not 
evidenced.   
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 • 2009 transitional restrictions affecting CEE countries that joined EU in 2004 were lifted. 
Despite these regulations, statistics show no noticeable changes in migration behavior 
can be linked to changes in the migration policy. Most policies concerning migration in 
Europe and worldwide are aimed at regulating entrance (inflow).However, these 
policies show no signs of decreasing the migration rate. These policies take the form of 
changing regulations or issue new ones that restrict the flow of migrants. The 
consequences of migration policies are hard to predict and test. In general, the cost and 
time wasted resulting from ineffective decisions and policies are huge and sometimes 
irreversible. SD model based policy analysis will provide policy makers with the 
chance to test policies and interact with the migration system in a learning environment 
before applying these policies in the real world. Furthermore, SD model based policy 
takes feasibility and implementation aspects into consideration when recommending 
policy. The policy model allows policy makers to consider the following questions: 
How can migration flows be regulated to achieve the desired quantity of migration?  
How do we implement this policy aim? How effective is the chosen policy?  
 
A major question facing policy makers concerns the desired quantity of migrants that 
fulfill the demographic and labour market needs of Norwegian society. Determining the 
desired level of migrants in Norway is a complicated issue that depends on the desired 
demographic composition. It is a highly political, humanitarian and social issue. Many 
variables contribute to the future shape of Norwegian demographics, including fertility 
rate, life expectancy, pensioners to labour force ratio and labour shortages etc. For 
simplicity, this study assumes that policy makers set a desired level of Polish migrants 
that are thought to be appropriate for the needs of Norwegian society.  
 
The proposed policy is based on projections of Polish migration produced by the 
explanatory model in the two scenarios described above. In brief, the recommended 
policy aims to control the Polish migration outflow. An incentive compensation 
program is proposed to encourage excess migrants to return to Poland. Feasibility 
analysis and implementation constraints are considered in the proposed policy. Both are 
vital criteria for evaluating the recommended policy. Based on the goal set by policy 
makers as to the desired number of Polish migrants, a compensation program policy 
will be developed to regulate migration outflow. The basic idea is to offer 
compensation incentive to targeted potential return migrants (unemployed migrants 
who have worked in Norway for at least 10 years) to encourage them to return to 
Poland. Figure 34 shows the proposed policy ‘Wishful Thinking’. The program will be 
financed using the unemployment benefit program and the pension fund. The main 
actors in the recommended policy are: 
 
                                 54 
(1) Ministry of Justice-Public Securities- Department of Migration. 
(2) Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organization (NAV).  The policy will be executed by NAV. 
(3) Committee on labor and social affairs (Norwegian parliament). 
 
Figure 34: The ‘Wishful Thinking’ policy to control migration outflows SFD 
4.2 Policy Approval Process 
The following figure shows the process of policy approval and the central role of the 
Department of Migration (Ministry of Justice). A discussion will be held between 
members of the Department of Migration, NAV and the Committee on Labour and 
Social Affairs (Norwegian Parliament). A new committee will be established with 
members from these departments. Research will be conducted to identify the 
appropriate and affordable compensation amount, followed by a survey among the 
Polish migrant community to determine the compensation amount that is acceptable to 
Polish migrants and Norwegian’s government. Once the committee is satisfied with the 
policy draft it will be sent to the Norwegian parliament for approval. NAV will be the 
execution agency for the new policy and will establish a new department to carry out 
the program. 
 
Figure 35: A flow chart demonstrates the complexity of the policy approval process 
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4.3 The Compensation Incentive Policy 
The initial compensation will be a one-time payment of (a) two years unemployment 
benefits plus (b) the pension that the migrant accumulated in pension fund. Concern 
around the rising level of migrants in a community is closely related to the argument 
that migrants increase the burden on the welfare system. This position is implicitly 
based on the assumption that there is a high unemployment rate in the country and in 
particular among migrants. Based on the aforementioned assumption, this study 
proposes that targeted potential return migrants are unemployed migrants who have 
lived and worked in Norway for at least 10 years. Residence time is adopted as 
selection criteria because migrants who have worked for at least 10 years have would 
have accumulated enough pensions to make the compensation amount attractive. In 
addition, they are likely to have family members living with them in Norway which 
increases the number of return migrants relative to the amount of compensation. Policy 
makers can choose different criteria, e.g. the salary level, the number of children they 
have, the education level, language skills etc. Given that the targeted migrants are 
unemployed they are entitled to unemployment benefits for two years. According to 
regulation the unemployment benefit is up to 65% of the average salary over the last 
three years. Hence that the targeted migrant would have worked for ten years, the 
amount of pension accumulated will be sufficiently attractive to incentivize the migrant 
to return to Poland. The policy’s main aim is to control migrant outflow. This study 
assumes that it is a good idea to pay the accumulated pension plus two years of 
unemployment benefits as a once-off payment to migrants who are willing to leave the 
country. The program may incentivize some migrants to return to Poland and use the 
money to start a small business and take advantage of the difference in living standards 
(lower prices in Poland) to have a better life. 
 
Figure 36: The compensation incentive policy SFD 
Figure 36 demonstrates that the potential migrant group is labour migrant (Migrant 
adjusted by non labour migrant fraction) divided by resident time set at 10 years.  A 
fraction of potential migrants will accept the compensation and be assigned to the 
return program. The assigned return migrant is dependent on the potential return 
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migrant and the program fraction. The program fraction is determined by the 
compensation program incentive which is a product of initial compensation and the 
policy effect. The policy effect is controlled by the policy maker decision. The initial 
compensation is the sum of unemployment benefits (2 years) and pension (accumulated 
over 10 years). The willingness of the policy maker to close the gap between the 
desired migrant level and the actual level is represented by the policy effect which 
controls the compensation amount. Assigned return migrants will return to Poland after 
a stipulated period that fulfills the program requirement.  
4.4 The Policy Effect 
 
Figure 37: SFD that demonstrate how the recommended policy work 
The policy maker’s willingness to close the gap between the desired migrant level and 
the actual level pressure him/her to increase the initial compensation program incentive. 
The compensation amount will increase to a level that he/she thinks is appropriate and 
acceptable to the potential return migrant. The presence of a bigger gap and a higher 
tendency by the policy maker to close it will push up the amount of compensation. The 
higher compensation amount raises the program fraction which increases the assigned 
return migrants. More assigned return migrants increase the return migrant outflow 
which raises the migration outflow. Higher migration outflow reduces the migrant stock 
which reduces the gap and so on (counteracting loop C1- Figure 37).  
4.5 The Policy Resources 
The basic resources required to implement the proposed policy are human resources 
and financial resources (Figure 38). 
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Human Resources: NAV will be the executing agency responsible for the program. A 
new department will be formed at NAV to carry out the program. The number of staff 
responsible for administrative and financial tasks is determined and adjusted by the 
hiring rate. The hiring rate is determined by indicated staff which depends on the 
number of assigned migrant cases that each staff member can process.  
 
Figure 38: Human and financial resources needed for the policy SFD 
Financial Resources: A fund will be established to finance the program. The fund will 
initially begin by taking out a loan in order to initiate the program. The fund increases 
by income and decreases by expenses.  Income is derived from the unemployment 
benefits and the accumulated pensions received as once-off payments into the fund.  
Expenses are determined by the amount of compensation program costs, which is the 
human resource costs plus the compensation amount paid to each assigned migrant. The 
fund deficit (the difference between expenses and income) will be covered by a loan. 
The matured debt plus the interest charged will be added to the expenses. 
4.6 Measuring Policy Effectiveness 
The SD policy model allows policy makers to test the feasibility of each policy scenario 
he/she chooses to simulate (e.g. changing the desired number of migrants, changing the 
compensation amount and/or changing the simulation period). The decision and policy 
makers will be able to review the outcome of each scenario that he/she chooses to 
simulate. The model interface provides an interactive learning environment to test and 
evaluate policy options.  
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Figure 39: Policy feasibility and effectiveness SFD 
The following are the main indicators used to measure policy feasibility:  
Debt Fund Ratio (Debt / Fund): As an indicator of policy program effectiveness, this 
ratio measures the effectiveness of each krone borrowed relative to the fund.  
Cost Benefit effectiveness (Cost / Benefit): As an indicator of policy program 
effectiveness, this variable measures the effectiveness of each krone spent on the 
program relative to the benefit achieved.  
Net Benefit (Benefit - Cost): This variable indicates the direct gain or loss of one 
returned migrant as a result of the policy program.  
Net income (Income - Expenses): This indicator measures the continuous present value 
of the program’s net income. 
Total number of the returned migrants: This variable indicates program achievements 
in terms of the total number of returned migrants as a result of the policy program.  
4.7 Policy Result 
The following graph demonstrates the simulation results of different policy scenarios: 
Simulation run number 1 (blue line) is the migrant level without any policy action.  
 
 
Figure 40: Simulation results with and without policy action 
This figure is based on the assumption that job vacancies remain at the 2014 level. 
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Simulation runs numbers 2 to 8 show migrant level under different policy options that 
are based on various desired level of migrants. Simulations may also be repeated with 
the compensation incentive set at various levels.  
4.8 Implementation Constraints 
Passing laws and regulations: 
Migration is a hot topic in the public domain. Implementing a return migration policy 
will be controversial issue between political parties especially when it includes the 
allocation of funds. Many politicians support the argument that migrants are a burden 
and exert pressure on the country’s welfare system especially in difficult economic 
cycle. On the other side, many consider the return option a morally complex issue. In 
addition, paying compensation to implement the policy adds complications to an 
already complicated issue. 
 
Funding:  
Funding is a political rather than economic decision because the compensation will be 
paid out regardless of policy action but will be paid over a longer period in the case of 
no policy. The direct beneficial outcome of the policy may be costly to start with but 
when indirect benefits are included it becomes less costly and more attractive. For 
example, the average social capital expenditure is over 70000 NOK per person/year and 
per-capita health care expenditure is around 35000 NOK per person/year. 
 
Human resources, executing agencies, coordination:  
The responsibilities and tasks assigned to NAV may create difficulties and coordination 
problems. The processes, documentation, signing documents, legal conflicts, time to 
leave the country and other administration issues may create difficulties and 
coordination problems. 
 
Targeted population and selection criteria issues:  
The residence time criteria (10 years) may contradict the fact that it is hard to 
encourage migrants to leave after such a long time period. However, the criteria for 
selecting the target population will be set by the policy makers. Criteria, may include 
salary level, number of children the potential migrants have, their education level, 
working skills, language proficiency, number of times the migrant has registered as 
unemployed, period of unemployment, number of times the migrant has depended on 
the social system etc. Any criteria chosen will be subject to constant critique and 
debate. 
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Eroding goal syndrome:  
The policy depends on both migrant responsiveness to the incentives offered and on the 
desired level of migrants that policy makers set. The recommended policy will be a 
compromise between the Migration Department and the migrants. This may lead to 
eroding goal syndrome (Figure 41) whereby the policy maker increases the level of 
desired migrants when he/she fails to achieve the previous goal. 
 
 
Figure 41: Eroding goal phenomena CLD 
Undesired consequences:  
(a) Increase migration inflows for the incentive attraction:  
The policy will be adapted when the level of migrants increases beyond the Norwegian 
social-economic system absorption capacity. This implicitly assumes that, less available 
jobs and a high unemployment rate. In other words, it will no longer be attractive for 
more potential migrants to make the move. Besides, not every migrant will be qualified 
for the selected criteria. The compensation is like an early retirement offer, similar to 
the way private businesses used to lay off their undesired workforce.  
(b) Controlling the return of migrants to Norway:  
Controlling the return of migrants to Norway once they have taken the compensation is 
a similar problem as preventing illegal migration. Policy makers can set up counter 
measures to prevent this from happening. For example migrants who have accepted the 
compensation offer will be required to pay back the compensation in the event that 
he/she wants to return to Norway. However, who implement the departure of the 
migrants and who control that they leave and do not come back is a major constrain for 
this policy and need further investigation. 
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Conclusion 
Two forces are responsible for the observed growth of the Polish migrant group in 
Norway. While one tended to feed migrant stock, the other opposes this tendency 
aiming to slow that growth. The dynamic interaction between these reinforcing and 
counteracting forces in a chain of cause-effect resulted in the rapid growth of Polish 
migrants. The combined effect of these reinforcing feedback structures, represented by 
the social and business network effect on migration risk, attractiveness, and residence 
time presents strong structural causes for the rapid rise in Polish migration. 
 
 
Figure 42: Forces responsible for the rapid growth of Polish Migration 
The accumulation process resulting from these reinforcing feedback structures 
empower the counteracting feedback structures represented by construction, low skilled 
and total job effects on the propensity to migrate added to the effect of relative wage 
and unemployment attractiveness. These counteracting feedback structures are 
relatively weak in the early phase of the migration process. Even though they gain 
strength as the migrant stock increases, they remain relatively weak and are dominated 
by the reinforcing structures. Empowering the counteracting loops will result in what is 
termed a shift in loop dominance. The relative strength of the reinforcing feedback 
structures has dominated and overruled the counteracting feedback structures effect 
leading to further and further increases in migrant level. The dynamic interaction 
between these reinforcing and counteracting feedback loops produces the exponential 
growth of Polish migrants. Despite the enhancement in the Polish wage level and 
unemployment rate, the unemployment and wage ratios did not change thereby 
reducing and delaying the counteracting effects of both variables to halt the rapid 
migration growth. In addition, the structurally built-in labour shortages in Norway 
apply constant pressure on the demand for foreign labour defusing the counteracting 
mechanism effect. In spite of this counteracting mechanism has been on work (as it 
halts the migration inflow - Figure 32 page: 49). However these counteracting 
structures remain weak and could not stop the rapid growth of the Polish migrant 
group.  
 
The explanatory model gives two possible scenarios on predicting Polish migrant 
trends until 2030. The first scenario is based on the condition that job vacancies remain 
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constant at the 2014 level. Consequently, the counteracting feedback structures will 
remain weak and overruled by the reinforcing structures. Second scenario is based on 
the condition that job vacancies follow the trend it takes from the previous years. 
Therefore, a shift in loop dominance will take place and the counteracting feedback 
structure will become the dominant structure which will bring down migrant level 
(Figure 33 page 52). 
 
Regulating migration flows is a complex task. Policy makers face difficult decisions 
with legal, political, economic, social, humanitarian, and moral implications. However, 
the proposed policy introduces an approach to deal with this king of complexity. It 
considers feasibility and implementation constraints in designing the policy. The policy 
model allows policy makers to pre-test different scenarios related to each desired 
migrant level and evaluate each chosen policy scenario. Moreover, policy makers will 
get the possibility to redesign the policy. This is an inherent feature of SD methodology 
in building and designing policy that involves policy and decision makers’ participation 
in drawing, designing and evaluating policy. The idea of offering incentives can be 
developed further into different forms, e.g. provide tax reduction for short term labour 
migrants or provide training and/or education programs for the targeted group. An 
incentive program should be considered as a two sides of one coin so that incentive 
policy options could also include de-incentive policy options. This means that another 
policy alternative is to tighten regulations in order to put pressure on migrants to leave. 
The basic idea found in the nature of the inflow (entrance) versus the nature of the 
outflow (leaving). Inflow tended to add to the migrant stock so controlling inflow will 
not reduce the migrant stock, rather it will add less migrants. (the nature is adding). On 
the other hand, outflow tended to subtract from the migrant stock (the nature is 
subtracting) so regulating outflow will reduce the migrant stock which is the policy 
goal.  To conclude, controlling entrance will not necessarily reduce the migrant number 
but rather add fewer migrants, while regulating the outflow positively reduces the 
migrant stock. 
 
Further research needs to be performed so as to extend the model, overcome the model 
limitations, and explore alternative policies that overcome the implementations 
constraints associate with the proposed policy.  Extending the model to include all 
migrant groups in Norway is necessary to provide a solid foundation for a migration 
policy that policy makers can be relied on. Such an extension will also provide the 
opportunity to test the model’s ability to explain migration as a global phenomenon 
rather than treat it as an isolated interaction between two countries. 
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Appendix 1: Measuring the relative wage attractiveness effect 
The statistical analysis approach of measuring the relationship: 
Relative wage attractiveness effect represents the propensity to migrate of Polish 
migrant due to wage differences (Gap) between Norway and Poland. Wage differences 
are expressed in terms of wage ratio which is the average wage in Norway relative to 
Poland. Propensity to migrate influences a fraction “migration fraction” of potential 
Polish migrant. Therefore, wage ratio impact on migration fraction represents relative 
wage attractiveness effect.  
Migration fraction is a function of wage ratio. To statistically measure this relationship 
we conduct a regression to the following actual data:  
 • Migration fraction, as the Dependent variables8:  
Migration fraction = Migration inflow / Migrant  
 • Wage ratio as the Independent variables9: 
Wage Ratio = Average Wage Norway / Average Wage Poland  




The regression result shows that it is a high degree of correlation (R= 0.89) between the 
wage ratio and the migration fraction. It is a positive relationship which means that an 
increase in the wage ratio will increase the migration fraction by the coefficient value 
“slope”. The result confirms a strong relationship “high R Square” with significant 
level of 95% as shown by P value and T test. We compare the regression result for 
“Poland –Norway” with a selected different countries that characteristics with the same 
Polish migratory pattern (represented by the migrant level). Regressions analysis 
conducted the same as above. The following is the results summary: 
 
                                                 
8 Data from SSB Table: 07822 and 05184 - (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
9 Data from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004-2013) 
http://stats.oecd.org/  
Wages data used are in USD with fixed exchange rates and constant prices of 2012. It is the average 











































Multiple R R Square Adj. R Squ. Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Norway 76662 0.90 0.80 0.66 0.07 5.372 0.00104 
Belgium  67926 0.98 0.97 0.84 0.04 15.804 0.00000 
Netherlands  86541 0.99 0.98 0.86 0.05 21.313 0.00000 
Sweden 75323 0.96 0.91 0.79 0.02 9.166 0.00002 
The regression result shows that the selected countries have almost similar estimation 
and graph pattern. The only difference is in the degree of the graph line steepness “the 
slope”. Norway has the highest coefficient value “higher slope” while Netherlands and 
Belgium have the same steep. Sweden has less steep curve. Norway higher slope may 
reflect the higher Relative wage attractiveness effect due to the higher average wage 
compared to the other countries. 
 
The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, 
(b) one or more specific points (c) the shape. The shape and slope of the graph will be 
based on the above estimated relationship from the actual data. The relationship is 
defined as follows: Relative wage attractiveness effect = f(wage ratio). We set wage ratio 
as index from 0 to 10, where (0) = no difference exist and (10) = Norway average wage 
is ten times Poland average wage. We set the Relative wage attractiveness effect as 
index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = no effect and (1) maximum effect.  
 
Note that it will be always a wage gap between the sources and host countries 
(minimum gap). In other word it will be a tolerance degree of wage differences which 
represents a no changes in the propensity to migrate. This means people will not 
migrate until a significant wage differences exists. We assume that the gap will be 
closing up when it approach (2). This is important for statistically measuring the 
relationship between these two variables which will show in the equation that shapes 
the curvature of the graph line. The intercept for Y axis (Relative wage attractiveness 
effect) will be zero when the ratio is below 2. This has a significant effect on the 
estimation of the  coefficient value “slope” and in testing the relationship between these 
variables. The R and R square value is low without that assumption. 
We use the estimated regression equation to extrapolate the graph trend that is relative 
to wage ratio index scale (the following right side graph). Then we normalize the wage 
attractiveness effect graph to a similar shape based on the graph extrapolation that 
results from applying the estimated regression equation. We use judgment and available 
information as well as the estimated slope and shape in normalizing the graph function. 
The relationship will be represented by the following graph function (left side graph): 
                                                 
10 Data from (OECD) Migrant, Migration Inflow, and wages (2004-2013) http://stats.oecd.org/  
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It will be no effect on the propensity to migrate when wage ratio < 2, then it will 
increase linearly as the ratio raise to reach the maximum effect. The relative wage 
attractiveness effect increases in linear steepness similar to the Coefficients “slope” 
measured by the regression as shown above. Sensitivity test has been conducted 
(appendix 9 page: 89) to test the effect of changing this estimated relationship form on 
the model behavior. Changing the slope and the shape of the estimated graph function 
shows no sensitivity. It also shows a little changing on the magnitude but the model 
produce the same pattern of behavior. 
Appendix 2: Measuring the relative unemployment attractiveness effect 
The statistical analysis approach of measuring the relationship: 
Relative unemployment attractiveness effect represents the propensity to migrate of 
Polish migrant due to unemployment differences (Gap) between Norway and Poland. 
Unemployment differences are expressed in terms of unemployment ratio which is the 
Poland unemployment rate relative to Norway. Propensity to migrate influences a 
fraction “migration fraction” of potential Polish migrant. Therefore, unemployment 
ratio impact on migration fraction represents relative unemployment attractiveness 
effect. Migration fraction is a function of unemployment ratio. To statistically measure 
this relationship we conduct a regression to the following actual data:  
 • Migration fraction, as the Dependent variables11:  
Migration fraction = Migration inflow / Migrant  
 • Unemployment ratio as the Independent variables: 
Unemployment Ratio = Unemployment Rate Poland12 / Unemployment Rate Norway13 
The following is the result of the correlation and regression analyses to the relationship: 
                                                 
11 Data from SSB Table: 07822 and 05184 - (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
12Data from Central Statistical Office of Poland - (2004-2013) http://stat.gov.pl/ 
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The regression result shows that it is a high degree of correlation (R= 0.87) between the 
unemployment ratio and the migration fraction. It is a positive relationship which 
means that an increase in the unemployment ratio will increase the migration fraction 
by the coefficient value. The result confirms a strong relationship “high R Square” with 
significant level of 95% as shown by P value and T test.   
 
We compare the regression result   for “Poland – Norway “with a selected different 
countries that characteristics with the same Polish migratory pattern (represented by the 
migrant level).  Regressions analysis conducted the same as above. The following is the 
results summary: 
 
Country Migrant  201314 Multiple R R Square Adj. R Squ. Coefficients t Stat P-value 
Norway 76662 0.88 0.77 0.66 0.09 5.483 0.00039 
Belgium  67926 0.94 0.89 0.77 0.09 8.053 0.00004 
Netherlands  86541 0.97 0.95 0.82 0.06 12.253 0.00000 
Sweden 75323 0.92 0.84 0.72 0.04 6.486 0.00019 
The regression result shows that the selected countries have almost similar estimation 
and graph pattern. The only difference is in the degree of the graph line steepness “ the 
slope”. Belgium and Norway have the same coefficient value “same slope” while 
Netherlands and Sweden have less steep curve. 
 
The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, 
(b) one or more specific points (c) the shape. The shape and slope of the graph will be 
based on the above estimated relationship from the actual data. The relationship is 
defined as follows: Relative unemployment attractiveness effect = f(unemployment ratio). 
We set unemployment ratio as index from 0 to 10, where (0) = no difference exist and 
(10) = Poland unemployment rate is ten times Norway unemployment rate. We set the 
Relative unemployment attractiveness effect as index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = no effect 
and (1) maximum effect. Note that it will be always an unemployment gap between 
                                                 



















R   0.877264 
R Square     0.769592 
Adjusted R Square   0.658481 
 Intercept     0 
Coefficients Un. Ratio 0.092121 
t Stat     5.4828 
P-value     0.000389 
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sources and host countries (minimum gap). In other word, it will be a tolerance degree 
of unemployment differences which represents a no changes in the propensity to 
migrate. This tolerance degree is the reasonable unemployment rate that economist 
accept as a low rate. This expressed in the term one digit unemployment rate. Build on 
that, this study assumes, the gap will be closing up when it approach (2). This is 
important for statistically measuring the relationship between these two variables which 
will show in the equation that shapes the curvature of the equation line. The intercept  
for Y axis (unemployment attractiveness effect) will be zero which has a significant 
effect on the estimation of the coefficient value and in testing the relationship between 
these variables. The R and R square value is low without that assumption. We use the 
estimated regression equation to extrapolate the graph trend that is relative to 
unemployment ratio index scale (the following right side graph). Then we normalize 
the relative unemployment attractiveness effect graph to a similar shape based on the 
graph extrapolation that results from applying the estimated regression equation. We 
use judgment and available information as well as the estimated slope and shape in 
normalizing the graph function. The relationship will be represented by the following 
graph function (the left side graph): 
 
    
It will be no effect on the propensity to migrate when unemployment ratio < 2, then it 
will increase linearly as the ratio raise to reach the maximum effect. The relative 
unemployment attractiveness effect increases in linear steepness similar to the 
coefficients measured by the regression as shown above. It will reach a satisfactory 
level at 0.8 and stop increasing due to: If the unemployment rate increases to that high, 
migration will not be the solution for the unemployment problem. The unemployed 
population will start a political struggle to solve that problem rather than try to migrate, 
which is not a possibility for every unemployed person. Sensitivity test has been 
conducted (appendix 9 page: 89) to test the effect of changing this estimated 
relationship form on the model behavior. Changing the slope and the shape of the 
estimated graph function shows no sensitivity. It also shows a changing on the 
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Appendix 3: Measuring the low skilled job effect 
The statistical analysis approach of measuring the relationship: 
Low skilled job effect represents the propensity to migrate of Polish migrant due to 
changing in Low skilled job ratio. Propensity to migrate influences a fraction 
“migration fraction” of potential Polish migrant. Low skilled job ratio impact on 
migration fraction represents the low skilled job effect.  
Migration fraction is a function of low skilled job ratio. To statistically measure this 
relationship we conduct a regression to the following actual data: 
 • Migration fraction, as the Dependent variables15:  
Migration fraction = Migration inflow / Migrant  
 • Low skilled job ratio as the independent variables: 
Low Skilled Job Ratio = Low Skilled Job Vacancies16 / Employed Polish17  
The following is the result of the correlation and regression analyses to the relationship: 
 
The regression result shows that it is a high degree of correlation (R= 0.86) between the 
low skilled job ratio and the migration fraction. It is a positive relationship which 
means that an increase in the low skilled job ratio will increase the migration fraction 
by the coefficient value. The result confirms a strong relationship “high R Square” with 
significant level of 95% as shown by P value and T test.   
                                                 
15 Data from SSB Table: 07822 and 05184 - (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
16 Data from NAV Table: 22 (2001-2013) 
 https://www.nav.no/no/NAV+og+samfunn/Statistikk/Arbeidssokere+og+stillinger+-+statistikk/Ledige+stillinger 
17 Data from SSB Table: 07184 and 0 6478 (2006-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
The data for the employed Polish migrant used only from 2006. The reason is the employed polish migrant data 
shows some inconsistence compared to other data from SSB. In some years the number of employed polish migrant 
is more than the total number of polish migrant. It may be mixed with short term  employed Polish migrant data, or it 
could be other reasons. However we use the available data. Moreover we use the data from 2006 due to the fact that 
the number of employed polish migrant in 2004 and 2005 were very small so the ratio was very high which affect the 
result of the regression. So when we use the data from 2006 the result come in consistency with the estimation for 


















Low  skilled Job ratio 
Regression Statistics 
R   0.868536 
R Square     0.754355  
Adjusted R Square   0.713414 
 Intercept     0.114775 
Coefficients Un. Ratio 0.253324 
t Stat     4.29249 
P-value     0.00513 
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The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, 
(b) one or more specific points (c) the shape. The shape and slope of the graph will be 
based on the above estimated relationship from the actual data. The relationship is 
defined as follows: Low skilled job effect = f( Perceived Low skilled job ratio) 
Perceived low skilled job ratio is the smoothed value of the incremental accumulation 
of low skilled job ratio Perceived ratio = ratio (t) - ratio (t-1) / Adjustment time 
We set low skilled job ratio as an index from 0 to 10, where (0) = no job and (10) = ten 
low skilled job vacancies per employed Polish. We set the low skilled job effect as 
index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = no effect and (1) is the maximum effect. We use the 
estimated regression equation to extrapolate the graph trend that is relative to low 
skilled job ratio index scale (right side graph). Then we normalize the total job effect 
graph to a similar shape based on the graph extrapolation that results from applying the 
estimated regression equation. We use judgment and available information as well as 
the estimated slope and shape in normalizing the graph function. The relationship will 
be represented by the following graph function (left side graph): 
 
    
 
It will be no effect on the propensity to migrate when the ratio equal 0, then it will 
increase in form of S shape growth, (increases slowly initially; then increases rapidly, 
approaching an exponential growth rate as in the J-shaped curve; but then slowly  
stabilizes) as low skilled job ratio increases reaching maximum effect around (0.65). 
Propensity to migrate due to low skilled job ratio will not grow forever. The maximum 
set to (0.65). The reason is Polish migrant is mainly recruited to fill low skilled job 
position in secondary labour market segment. Therefore, it is a higher percentage of the 
low skilled labour will migrate as a result of higher perceived low skilled job ratio. 
Sensitivity test has been conducted (appendix 9 page: 89) to test the effect of changing 
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shape of the estimated graph function shows little sensitivity. This insignificant 
sensitivity was a little changing on the magnitude but the model produce the same 
pattern of behavior. 
Appendix 4: Measuring the construction job effect 
The statistical analysis approach of measuring the relationship: 
Construction job effect represents the propensity to migrate of Polish migrant due to 
changing in construction job ratio. Propensity to migrate influences a fraction 
“migration fraction” of potential Polish migrant. Therefore, Construction job ratio 
impact on migration fraction represents the construction job effect.  
Migration fraction is a function of construction job ratio. To statistically measure this 
relationship we conduct a regression to the following actual data: 
 • Migration fraction, as the Dependent variables18:  
Migration fraction = Migration inflow / Migrant  
 • Construction job ratio as the independent variables: 
Construction Job Ratio = Construction Job Vacancies19 / Construction Polish Worker20  
The following is the result of the correlation and regression analyses to the relationship: 
 
The regression result shows that it is a high degree of correlation (R= 0.96) between the 
construction job ratio and the migration fraction. It is a positive relationship which 
means that an increase in the construction job ratio will increase the migration fraction 
by the coefficient value. The result confirms a strong relationship “high R Square” with 
significant level of 95% as shown by P value and T test.   
 
The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, 
(b) one or more specific points (c) the shape. The shape and slope of the graph will be 
                                                 
18 Data from SSB Table: 07822 and 05184  (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
19 Data from NAV Table: 22 (2001-2013)  

















Construction job Ratio 
Regression Statistics 
R   0.9676052 
R Square     0.936259 
Adjusted R Square   0.920324 
 Intercept     0.082147 
Coefficients Un. Ratio 0.4814352 
t Stat     7.66516 
P-value     0.00155 
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based on the above estimated relationship from the actual data. The relationship is 
defined as follows: Construction job effect = f( Perceived construction job ratio) 
Perceived construction job ratio is the smoothed value of the incremental accumulation 
of construction job ratio Perceived ratio = ratio (t) - ratio (t-1) / Adjustment time 
We set construction job ratio as an index from 0 to 10, where (0) = no job and (10) = 
ten construction job vacancies per Polish construction worker. We set the construction 
job effect as index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = no effect and (1) is the maximum effect. 
We use the estimated regression equation to extrapolate the graph trend that is relative 
to construction job ratio index scale(right side graph). Then we normalize the 
construction job effect graph to a similar shape based on the graph extrapolation that 
results from applying the estimated regression equation. We use judgment and available 
information as well as the estimated slope and shape in normalizing the graph function. 
The relationship will be represented by the following graph function (left side graph): 
 
    
 
It will be no effect on the propensity to migrate when the ratio equal 0, then it will 
increase in form of S shape growth, (increases slowly initially; then increases rapidly, 
approaching an exponential growth rate as in the J-shaped curve; but then slowly  
stabilizes) as construction job ratio increases reaching maximum effect around (0.8). 
Propensity to migrate due to construction job ratio will not grow forever. The 
maximum set to 0.8 due to: Polish construction migrant is the dominance category of 
Polish labour migrant. Moreover, Polish migrant is the dominant migrant group in 
Norwegian construction sector. They recruited mainly to fill the job position in the 
construction sector. Therefore, it is a higher percentage of the construction labour will 
migrate as a result of higher perceived construction job ratio. Sensitivity test has been 
conducted (appendix 9 page: 89) to test the effect of changing this estimated 
relationship form on the model behavior. Changing the slope and the shape of the 
estimated graph function shows little sensitivity. This insignificant sensitivity was a 
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Appendix 5: Measuring the total job effect 
The statistical analysis approach of measuring the relationship: 
Total job effect represents the propensity to migrate of Polish migrant due to changing 
in total job ratio. Propensity to migrate influences a fraction “migration fraction” of 
potential Polish migrant. Therefore, total job ratio impact on migration fraction 
represents the total job effect.  
Migration fraction is a function of total job ratio. To statistically measure this 
relationship we conduct a regression to the following actual data: 
 • Migration fraction, as the Dependent variables21:  
Migration fraction = Migration inflow / Migrant  
 • Total job ratio as the independent variables: 
Total Job Ratio = Total Job Vacancies22 / Polish Migrant 23  
Total job vacancies are the percentage of job vacancies available to migrant relative to 
the total population in Norway: 
Total Job Vacancies = Job Vacancies * (Total Migrant / Population)24 
The following is the result of the correlation and regression analyses to the relationship: 
 
The regression result shows that it is a moderately degree of correlation (R= 0.68) 
between the total job ratio and the migration fraction. It is a positive relationship which 
means that an increase in the total job ratio will increase the migration fraction by the 
coefficient value. The result confirm a fair  relationship between the two variables 
“moderately R Square”  with  reasonable significant level of  95% as shown by P value 
and T test.  The result is in consistency with dual market theory of migration which 
indicates that the vast majority of migration happened to fill the gap in secondary 
                                                 
21 Data from SSB Table: 07822 and 05184  (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
22 Data from NAV Table: 22 (2001-2013)  
23 Data from SSB Table: 05184- (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 

















Total Job Ratio 
Regression Statistics 
R   0.686311 
R Square     0.471023  
Adjusted R Square   0.404901 
 Intercept     0.133188 
Coefficients Un. Ratio 0.21051 
t Stat     2.66899 
P-value     0.028406 
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labour market segment rather than primary market segment. Construction and Low 
skilled job effect have major influence on migration inflows more than total job effect. 
The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, 
(b) one or more specific points (c) the shape. The shape and slope of the graph will be 
based on the above estimated relationship from the actual data. The relationship is 
defined as follows: Total job effect = f( Perceived total job ratio) 
Perceived total job ratio is the smoothed value of the incremental accumulation of total 
job ratio Perceived ratio = ratio (t) - ratio (t-1) / Adjustment time 
We set total job ratio as an index from 0 to 10, where (0) = no job and (10) = ten job 
vacancies per Polish migrant. We set the total job effect as index from 0 to 1. Where (0) 
= no effect and (1) is the maximum effect. We use the estimated regression equation to 
extrapolate the graph trend that is relative to the total job ratio index scale (right side 
graph). Then we normalize the total job effect graph to a similar shape based on the 
graph extrapolation that results from applying the estimated regression equation. We 
use judgment and available information as well as the estimated slope and shape in 
normalizing the graph function. The left side graph represents the graph function: 
 
    
It will be no effect on the propensity to migrate when the ratio equal 0, then it will 
increase in form of S shape growth, (increases slowly initially; then increases rapidly, 
approaching an exponential growth rate as in the J-shaped curve; but then slowly  
stabilizes) as total job ratio increases reaching maximum effect around (0.4). Propensity 
to migrate due to total job ratio will not grow forever. The maximum set to 0.4 as a 
reasonable estimation compare to the estimated value for both construction and low 
skilled job effect. The reason is the Polish migrant is mainly recruited to fill the low 
skilled job position in the secondary labour market sectors. Therefore, it is a lower 
percentage of the Polish labour will migrate as a result of higher  perceived total job 
ratio in the primary labour market sectors. Sensitivity test has been conducted 




















Total job ratio 
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the model behavior. Changing the slope and the shape of the estimated graph function 
shows no sensitivity and no changes in the model pattern of behavior.  
Appendix 6: Measuring the social network effect on migration risk 
The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Migration research has shown that the process of migration is a self-sustaining and 
network-driven phenomenon. As a result of large inflows of migrants, migrant 
networks maybe formed. Migrant network help potential migrants by reduce costs, 
uncertainties, and risks involved in migration "Network Theory of Migration". The 
Polish migrant whom come to Norway face a high degree of risk in the early stage of 
migration in particularly in the year 2004 and 2005 when Poland joined the EU. They 
do not know the language, and they have low education and poor English language. So 
they rely mainly on the native Polish community to help them in the work necessarily 
communication. In addition Norway is very expensive country, so accommodation and 
financial support is a big issue in migration decision.  Newcomers rely on the support 
of their native community in accommodation and financial support during the early 
stage of their arrival. The capacity to accommodate the new comer is directly and 
strongly related to the size of the Polish community. In conclusion the Polish 
community size is a critical factor for posting the Polish migration inflow to Norway.  
 
Social network size is measured in terms of Polish migrant ratio which is Polish 
migrant relative to total migrant in Norway. The relationship is defined as follows:  
 Social network effect on migration risk = f( Polish migrant ratio) 
• Social network effect on migration risk will be the Dependent variables:  
• Polish migrant ratio is the Independent variables: 
 Polish Migrant Ratio = Polish Migrant / Total Migrant  
 
To measure the impact of social network in the risk associated with migration decision  
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the relationship graph function, 
(a) one or more specific points, (b) the slope, (c) the shape.  
 
Determine specific points: We set Polish migrant ratio as index from 0 to 0.15, where 
near (0) = no significant representation of Polish migrant and (0.15) = Polish migrant 
are 15 % of the total migrant. Social network effect on migration risk can be expressed 
as index varies from 0 to 1 where, (1) represents the highest degree of risk and (0) is the 
lowest degree. It will be always a certain degree of risk involved with migration 
decision due to uncertainties, financial, accommodation, psychological and other 
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factors. We set 0.3 as the minimum degree of risk involved in the migration decision no 
matter how big the social network is. We set 0.8 as a maximum degree as it will be 
always a pioneer whom willing to take the migration risk no matter how high it is. It 
will always be a number of migrants whom migrate due to different reason regardless 
the degree of risk involved in the migration “e.g. refugee”.  
Determine the slope and shape: This study assumes that risk will decrease in an 
exponential decay as the Polish migrant ratio increases. As migrant community expands 
the risk will drop rapidly in the beginning then, the risk decreasing rate will slow down 
to reach the minimum value at (0.3).  
We use judgment and available information to normalize the graph function. The 




It will be no effect on migration risk when Polish migrant ratio near 0, then it will 
decrease as an exponential decay function, rapidly decreases initially; then slowly 
stabilizes as the ratio increases reaching minimum effect at (0.3).  
 
Sensitivity test has been conducted (appendix 9 page: 89) to test the effect of changing 
the above relationship form on the model behavior. Changing the slope and the shape of 
the above graph function shows high sensitivity degree to a linear shape of the graph. 
However the changing is in magnitude but the model produce the same pattern of 
behavior. When the migrant community expands to a certain size (critical point) the 
migration risk will drop very rapidly. Statistics shows that the size of Polish migrant 
stock has doubled in the first two years then it doubled almost each one and halve 
years. This could be reflected on a rapid decrease of migration risk as the migrant 
community rapidly expands.  
                                 80 
Appendix 7: Measuring business network effect on migration attractiveness 
The statistical analysis approach of measuring the relationship: 
Business network effect on migration attractiveness represents the propensity to 
migrate of Polish migrant due to the expanding size of business network. Business 
network size is measured in terms of Polish employed ratio which is Polish employed 
migrant relative to total employed migrant. Propensity to migrate affects migration 
inflow. Therefore, Polish employed ratio impact on migration inflow represents 
business network effect.  
Migration inflow is a function of Polish employed ratio. To statistically measure this 
relationship we conduct a regression to the following actual data: 
 • Migration Inflow, as the Dependent variables25:  
 • Polish employed ratio as the Independent variables26: 
Polish Employed Ratio = Polish Employed Migrant / Total Employed Migrant  
The following is the result of the correlation and regression analyses to the relationship: 
 
 
The regression result shows that it is a high degree of correlation (R = 0.78) between 
the Polish employed ratio and the migration inflow. It is a positive relationship which 
means that an increase in the Polish employed ratio will increase the migration inflow 
by the coefficient value. The result confirms a moderately strong relationship “R 
Square” with significant level of 95% as shown by P value and T test.   
 
The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, 
(b) one or more specific points (c) the shape. The shape and slope of the graph will be 
based on the above estimated relationship from actual data. The relationship is defined 
as follows: Business network effect on migration attractiveness = f(Polish employed ratio). 
We set Polish employed ratio as index from 0 to 0.20, where (0) = no significant 
representation of employed Polish and (0.20) = employed Polish are 20 % of the total 
                                                 
25 Data from SSB Table: 07822 and 05184 - (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
















Polish Employed Ratio 
Regression Statistics 
R   0.787185 
R Square     0.619660 
Adjusted R Square   0.572117 
 Intercept     1737.6 
Coefficients Un. Ratio 75226.4 
t Stat     3.61024 
P-value     0.00687  
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employed migrant. Attractiveness can be expressed as index varies from 0 to 1 where 1 
represents the highest degree and 0 is the lowest degree. We set the business network 
effect on attractiveness as index from 0 to 1. Where (0) = no effect and (1) maximum 
effect. Note that, it will be always a certain limit or ceiling that prevents the 
attractiveness from reaching the maximum value no matter how big the labour migrant 
community is. For instance job availability, attitude toward immigrant, and other 
factors will be limiting factors that stop the network effect from growing forever. We 
set 0.67 as the maximum degree that attractiveness could reach no matter how big the 
business network is. We use the estimated regression graph (the following right side 
graph) to normalize the business network effect on attractiveness graph to a similar 
shape. We use judgment and available information as well as the estimated slope and 
shape in normalizing the graph function. The relationship will be represented by the 
following graph function (the left side graph): 
  
     
It will be no effect on propensity to migrate when Polish employed ratio near 0, then it 
will increase linearly as the employed ratio raise to reach maximum effect. The 
business network effect on attractiveness increases in linear steepness similar to the 
slope measured by the regression as shown above. It will reach a satisfactory level at 
0.67. Sensitivity test has been conducted (appendix 9 page: 89) to test the effect of 
changing the estimated relationship form on the model behavior. Changing slope and 
shape of the estimated graph function shows little sensitivity. This insignificant 
sensitivity was a changing on the magnitude but the model produce the same behavior. 
Appendix 8: Measuring the social network effect on residence time 
The statistical analysis approach of measuring the relationship: 
Social network effect on residence time represents the tendency to settle of Polish 
migrant due to the expanding size of social network. Social network size is measured in 
terms of Polish migrant ratio which is Polish migrant relative to total migrant in 
















Polish Employed Ratio 
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(a) The actual length of stay, which is the time Polish migrant stock takes to drain 
(Migrant stock / Migration Outflow). It means the period of time elapsed if all 
Polish migrant leave the country in the same outflow pace  
(b) The average residence time which is calculated from the registered data of 
labour migrant by years of residence in Norway.  
Dividing the actual length of stay by the average residence time gives us a factor 
represents the tendency to settle. 
 Length of Stay = (Polish Migrant / Polish Migration Outflow)27  
 Tendency to Settle = Length of Stay / Average Residence Time28 
The tendency to settle impact on average residence time will represent social network 
effect. Tendency to settle is a function of Polish migrant ratio. To statistically measure 
this relationship we conduct a regression to the following actual data:  
 • Tendency to settle, as the Dependent variables:  
Tendency to Settle  = (Polish Migrant / Polish Migration Outflow) / Average Residence Time 
 • Polish migrant ratio as the Independent variables: 
Polish Migrant Ratio = Polish Migrant / Total Migrant  
The following is the result of the correlation and regression analyses to the relationship: 
 
The regression result shows that it is a high degree of correlation (R= 0.88) between the 
Polish migrant ratio and the tendency to settle. It is a positive relationship which means 
that an increase in the Polish migrant ratio will increase the tendency to settle by the 
coefficient value. The result confirms a strong relationship “R Square” with significant 
level of 95% as shown by P value and T test.   
 
The System Dynamic approach of measuring the relationship using the graph function: 
Three important issues need to consider in formulating the graph function: (a) the slope, 
(b) one or more specific points (c) the shape. The shape and slope of the graph will be 
                                                 
27 Data from SSB Table: 05184, 07822 and  07110 - (2004-2013) http://www.ssb.no/ 
28 Data from SSB Table: 06478 (2001-2008).     It is the average period of residence weighted by the 
number of employed in each residence category. Calculated based on the year 2004( Total employed 
polish 4837, Settled 4 years and less 1554, Settled 4-6 years 327, Settled 7 years and more 2956 ) 

















Polish Migrant Ratio 
Regression Statistics 
R   0.88834 
R Square     0.78916 
Adjusted R Square   0.67805 
 Intercept     0 
Coefficients Un. Ratio 60.615 
t Stat     5.8040 
P-value     0.00025 
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based on the above estimated relationship from the actual data. The relationship is 
defined as follows: Social network effect on residence time = f(Polish migrant ratio). 
We set Polish migrant ratio as index from 0 to 0.15, where near (0) = no significant 
representation of Polish migrant and (0.15) = Polish migrant are 15 % of the total 
migrant. Social network effect on residence time can be expressed as index varies from 
0 to 6 where (0) is the lowest degree and (6) is the highest degree. Six means that the 
average residence time will increase six times due to the expanding Polish migrant 
community. Note that it will be always a certain limit that prevents the tendency to 
settle from reaching a higher value “e.g. the life expectancy is the maximum value”. In 
the model six is the maximum value “which will be around 36 years” as a direct effect 
of growing Polish community. We use the estimated regression graph (the following 
right side graph) to normalize the social network effect on residence time graph to a 
similar shape. We use judgment and available information as well as the estimated 
slope and shape in normalizing the graph function. The relationship will be represented 




It will be no effect on the average residence time when Polish employed ratio near 0, 
then it will increase as a goal a seeking function, increases rapidly initially; then slowly 
stabilizes as Polish migrant ratio increases reaching maximum effect. Sensitivity test 
has been conducted (appendix 9 page: 89) to test the effect of changing this estimated 
relationship form on the model behavior. Changing the slope and the shape of the 
estimated graph function shows high sensitivity degree to a linear shape of the graph. 
However  the changing is in magnitude but the model produce the same pattern of 
behavior. When the migrant community reaches a certain size (critical point) the 
tendency to settle will increase very rapidly. Statistics shows that the size of Polish 
migrant stock has doubled in the first two years then it doubled almost each one and 
halve years. This could  be reflected on a rapid increase in the tendency to settle as the 
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Direct Structure Validity Tests
Structure-confirmation test Comparing the model structure with  Mapping how the real system work is the method applied in constructing this model.  The  
 information (quantitative or qualitative) representation of each relationship has been formulated according to information and 
 obtained directly from the real system  data from the real system. Literature theoretical framework has been extensively used 
 and reflected on the model structure involving each relationship. It is an iterative process 
where model structure and relationships have been modified and/or changed.
 
Parameter-confirmation test (A) Parameter value is corresponding (1) Most of the parameter value comes  from real data about the system
      to real system Data (2) Initial Value of stock and the parameter used from real data 
(B) Estimated Parameter value is based The estimated parameter specially the graph function all estimated  based on real
        on real system Data  data except the  measurement of the social network effect  on migration Risk. 
It has been measured using available  information and judgment.
Direct extreme-condition test Test Model equations under extreme  conditions, All the equation tested under extreme condition by giving zero value to the variables 
resulting in similar value  of what would logically alternately  and it all behave logically to  what would happened in the e real life.
 happen  under a similar  condition in real life
Dimensional consistency test checking the equation right hand side unit The model passes that test.  
 is equal to the  left hand side unit for It is a built in function in ithink software to check unite consistency.
 dimensional consistency 
 
Model Validation
Test Type Test Purpose The Test  
 These tests do not involve simulation








  In-Direct Validity Tests
Extreme-condition test Assigning extreme values to selected this test has been conducted to the model in steady state condition and in normal system 
 parameters and comparing the model- state. The changes in value for the steady state condition entered manually into the equation
generated behavior  to the observed due to the fact that the model initialized numerically rather than automatically. The changing in
(or anticipated) behavior of the real value for normal system state can be repeated  in the model interface in which the user interact
system under the same  extreme condition.  in a  laboratory  environment and changing  the value and see the results simultaneous.
The test  measured by evaluating its effect on Migrant Stock  & Migration Inflow 
Total Job Vacancies Higher Increase Higher Increase Increase Increase
Construction Job Vacancies Higher Increase Higher Increase Increase Increase
Low skilled job Vacancies Higher Increase Higher Increase Increase Increase
Migrant Needed Higher Increase Higher Increase Increase Increase
Wage ratio Increase Increase Increase Increase
Unemployment ratio Increase Increase Increase Increase
perception time adjustment for Total job   Not significant Chang
perception time adjustment for Construction job   Not significant Chang
perception time adjustment for Low skilled job   Not significant Chang
These tests involve simulation
Test Type Test Purpose The Test  
Model Validation
Applying certain behavior tests on model-generated  behavior patterns. 
Parameter and Variables
significant when
it is longer than 
6 month
Steady state Real system state
Expected Behavior Test ResultTest ResultExpected Behavior






  In-Direct Validity Tests
Behavior sensitivity test Test Parameters to find  which the model is The test has been implemented  in the normal system state. 
highly sensitive to and asking if the real The test can be repeated  in the model interface in which the user can interact in a  laboratory 
system would exhibit similar high sensitivity setting environment and changing  the value and see the results simultaneous 
 to the corresponding parameters. The test  measured by evaluating its effect on Migrant Stock and Migration Inflow
 The model shows sensitivity to the changes over 20% in the value of the parameters.
However the real system would exhibit a similar sensitivity to the corresponding parameters.
Total Job Vacancies Sensitive Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Construction Job Vacancies Sensitive Very Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Low skilled job Vacancies Sensitive Very Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Migrant Needed Sensitive Very Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Wage Poland Sensitive Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Wage Norway Sensitive Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Unemployment rate Poland Sensitive Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Unemployment rate Norway Sensitive Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
perception time adjustment for Total job  Not sensitive  Not sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
perception time adjustment for Construction job  Not sensitive  Not sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape





Expected Behavior Test Result
Test Type Test Purpose The Test  
Applying certain behavior tests on model-generated  behavior patterns. 
These tests involve simulation





  In-Direct Validity Tests
Behavior sensitivity test Test Parameters to find  which the model is The test has been conducted  to the graph function as well. The test can be
highly sensitive to and asking if the real  repeated  in the model interface in which the user can interact in a  laboratory setting 
system would exhibit similar high sensitivity environment and changing  the  the shape and the slopeand see the results simultaneous. 
 to the corresponding parameters. The test  measured by evaluating its effect on Migrant Stock and Migration Inflow.
 All the results have been changes in magnitude but the same pattern of behavior.  
Relative wage attractiveness effect Less / High slope  Not sensitive little Changing in Magnitude but  same shape
Relative unemployment attractiveness effect Less / High slope  Not sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Social network effect on migration risk Linear shape Very Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Business network effect on migration attractivenesLess / High slope  little sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Social network effect on residence time linear shape Very Sensitive Changing in Magnitude but the same shape
Low skilled job effect Less / High slope  little sensitive little Changing in Magnitude but  same shape
Construction job effect Less / High slope  little sensitive little Changing in Magnitude but  same shape
Total job effect Less / High slope  Not sensitive No Change
Integration Method test Check if  Model behavior is sensitive to changes Cut time step to half, 1/4 and etc. Then  simulate, the result is no changes in 
in time step and numerical integration method the pattern of behavior  
  Changing integration method does not affect the Model behavior
 
Boundary adequacy test Check that the model structure creating the The model pattern of behavior is not affected  by parameter values or external condition 
observed behavior endogenously. (e.g. economic  crises in 2008).  Rather by the underlying feedback structure and 
  the dynamic interaction between it is loops.
 The model structure creates the observed behavior endogenously.
Applying certain behavior tests on model-generated  behavior patterns. 
These tests involve simulation
 Behavior Pattern
Model Validation
Test Type Test Purpose The Test  
Parameter and Variables
Real system state
Graph shape & slope Test Result






 Does the model reproduce the behavior of inter- The model  generate and replicate the historical behavior of the real Polish migrant 
est in the system qualitatively and quantitatively  stock trend to Norway with a high degree qualitatively and quantitatively.
Does the model generate  the  various modes The model  generate a very close  pattern of behavior for most of other variables. The shape
 of behavior of other variables in the system   is closely similar but the magnitude and some face shifted happened to some variables
Testing the hypotheses We cut the loops or a variables effects that represent one hypothesis to test that hypothesis.
The null hypothesis will be: cutting loop or a variable effect no effect on  Migrant Stock (MS)
  & Migration Inflow (MI). The degree of the effect is ranked
Social network effect on migration risk No effect on MS & MI increased very high degree
Social network effect on residence time No effect on MS & MI reduced Higher degree
Social network effect on migration attractiveness No effect on MS & MI reduced Higher degree
Relative wage attractiveness effect No effect on MS & MI reduced High degree
Relative unemployment attractiveness effect No effect on MS & MI reduced High degree
Construction job effect No effect on MS & MI reduced low degree
Low skilled job effect No effect on MS & MI reduced low degree
Total job effect No effect on MS & MI reduced Very Low degree
These tests involve simulation
Model Validation
Test Type Test Purpose The Test  
Loops and  Model sub-structure catted
Real system state
Null hypothesis Effect on MS & MI Effect Degree Test Result
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Appendix 10: Model Equation       
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